Valid accounts in cloud environments may allow adversaries to perform actions to achieve Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Cloud accounts are those created and configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration of resources within a cloud service provider or SaaS application. Cloud Accounts can exist solely in the cloud; alternatively, they may be hybrid-joined between on-premises systems and the cloud through syncing or federation with other identity sources such as Windows Active Directory. (Citation: AWS Identity Federation)(Citation: Google Federating GC)(Citation: Microsoft Deploying AD Federation)
Service or user accounts may be targeted by adversaries through Brute Force, Phishing, or various other means to gain access to the environment. Federated or synced accounts may be a pathway for the adversary to affect both on-premises systems and cloud environments - for example, by leveraging shared credentials to log onto Remote Services. High privileged cloud accounts, whether federated, synced, or cloud-only, may also allow pivoting to on-premises environments by leveraging SaaS-based Software Deployment Tools to run commands on hybrid-joined devices.
An adversary may create long lasting Additional Cloud Credentials on a compromised cloud account to maintain persistence in the environment. Such credentials may also be used to bypass security controls such as multi-factor authentication.
Cloud accounts may also be able to assume Temporary Elevated Cloud Access or other privileges through various means within the environment. Misconfigurations in role assignments or role assumption policies may allow an adversary to use these mechanisms to leverage permissions outside the intended scope of the account. Such over privileged accounts may be used to harvest sensitive data from online storage accounts and databases through Cloud API or other methods.
View in MITRE ATT&CK®Capability ID | Capability Description | Mapping Type | ATT&CK ID | ATT&CK Name | Notes |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
PR.IR-01.05 | Remote access protection | Mitigates | T1078.004 | Cloud Accounts |
Comments
This diagnostic statement implements security controls and restrictions for remote user access to systems. Remote user access control involves managing and securing how users remotely access systems, such as through encrypted connections and account use policies, which help prevent adversary access.
References
|
PR.AA-05.04 | Third-party access management | Mitigates | T1078.004 | Cloud Accounts |
Comments
This diagnostic statement includes implementation of controls for third-party access to an organization’s systems. Conditional access policies can be used to block logins from non-compliant devices or from outside defined IP ranges.
References
|
PR.PS-06.01 | Secure SDLC process | Mitigates | T1078.004 | Cloud Accounts |
Comments
This diagnostic statement provides for secure system development, which includes ensuring that applications do not store sensitive data or valid account credentials insecurely (e.g., plaintext credentials in code, published credentials in repositories, or credentials in public cloud storage).
References
|
PR.AA-05.02 | Privileged system access | Mitigates | T1078.004 | Cloud Accounts |
Comments
This diagnostic statement protects against Cloud Accounts through the use of privileged account management and the use of multi-factor authentication.
References
|
DE.CM-06.02 | Third-party access monitoring | Mitigates | T1078.004 | Cloud Accounts |
Comments
This diagnostic statement protects against Cloud Accounts through the use of privileged account management. Employing auditing, privilege access management, and just in time access protects against adversaries trying to obtain illicit access to critical systems.
References
|
PR.PS-01.07 | Cryptographic keys and certificates | Mitigates | T1078.004 | Cloud Accounts |
Comments
This diagnostic statement protects against Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts through the use of revocation of keys and key management. Employing key protection strategies for key material used as part of multi-factor authentication for valid accounts, limitations to specific accounts along with access control mechanisms provides protection against adversaries attempting to use valid accounts.
References
|
DE.CM-03.03 | Privileged account monitoring | Mitigates | T1078.004 | Cloud Accounts |
Comments
This diagnostic statement implements mechanisms and tools to mitigate potential misuse of privileged users and accounts. Continuous monitoring of role and attribute assignments and activity is essential to prevent and detect unauthorized access or misuse.
References
|
PR.AA-01.02 | Physical and logical access | Mitigates | T1078.004 | Cloud Accounts |
Comments
This diagnostic statement describes how the organization ensures users are identified and authenticated before accessing systems, applications, and hardware, with logical access controls permitting access only to authorized individuals with legitimate business needs. Logical access controls in relation to systems can refer to the use of MFA, user account management, and other role-based access control mechanisms to enforce policies for authentication and authorization of user accounts.
References
|
PR.AA-03.01 | Authentication requirements | Mitigates | T1078.004 | Cloud Accounts |
Comments
This diagnostic statement describes how the organization implement appropriate authentication requirements, including selecting mechanisms based on risk, utilizing multi-factor authentication where necessary, and safeguarding the storage of authenticators like pins and passwords to protect sensitive access credentials.
References
|
PR.AA-01.01 | Identity and credential management | Mitigates | T1078.004 | Cloud Accounts |
Comments
This diagnostic statement protects against Cloud Accounts through the use of hardened access control policies, secure defaults, password complexity requirements, multifactor authentication requirements, and removal of terminated accounts.
References
|
Capability ID | Capability Description | Mapping Type | ATT&CK ID | ATT&CK Name | Notes |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
CVE-2024-53704 | SonicWall SonicOS SSLVPN Improper Authentication Vulnerability | primary_impact | T1078.004 | Cloud Accounts |
Comments
Due to improper session cookie validation in SonicOS, an attacker can hiijack an active session without any credentials.
References
|
Capability ID | Capability Description | Mapping Type | ATT&CK ID | ATT&CK Name | Notes |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
microsoft_sentinel | Microsoft Sentinel | technique_scores | T1078.004 | Cloud Accounts |
Comments
The following Microsoft Sentinel Hunting queries can identify potential compromise of cloud accounts: "New Admin account activity which was not seen historically", "New client running queries", "New users running queries", "User returning more data than daily average", "User Login IP Address Teleportation", "Non-owner mailbox login activity", "Powershell or non-browser mailbox login activity", "Rare User Agent strings" and "Same IP address with multiple csUserAgent" which may indicate that an account is being used from a new device, "Rare domains seen in Cloud Logs", "Same User - Successful logon for a given App and failure on another App within 1m and low distribution", "Anomalous Azure Active Directory Apps based on authentication location", "Anomalous Geo Location Logon", "Anomalous Sign-in Activity", "Azure Active Directory sign-in burst from multiple locations", and "Azure Active Directory signins from new locations".
The following Microsoft Sentinel Analytics queries can identify potential compromise of cloud accounts: "Anomalous User Agent connection attempt" and "New UserAgent observed in last 24 hours", which may indicate that an account is being used from a new device which may belong to an adversary; "Anomalous sign-in location by user account and authenticating application", "GitHub Signin Burst from Multiple Locations", "GitHub Activites from a New Country", and "Sign-ins from IPs that attempt sign-ins to disabled accounts", which may indicate adversary access from atypical locations; "Azure Active Directory PowerShell accessing non-AAD resources", "Anomalous login followed by Teams action", "Login to AWS management console without MFA", and "Azure Active Directory PowerShell accessing non-AAD resources" which may indicate an adversary attempting to use a valid account to access resources from other contexts. The "Correlate Unfamiliar sign-in properties" query can further enhance detection of anomalous activity.
References
|
defender_for_storage | Microsoft Defender for Cloud: Defender for Storage | technique_scores | T1078.004 | Cloud Accounts |
Comments
This control may generate alerts based on unfamiliar or suspicious IP addresses, TOR exit node, and anonymous access.
References
|
advanced_threat_protection_for_azure_sql_database | Advanced Threat Protection for Azure SQL Database | technique_scores | T1078.004 | Cloud Accounts |
Comments
This control may alert on logon events that are suspicious. This includes logins from unusual locations, logins from suspicious IP addresses, and users that do not commonly access the resource. These alerts may limit the ability of an attacker to utilize a valid cloud account to access and manipulate Azure databases.
References
|
ai_security_recommendations | Microsoft Defender for Cloud: AI Security Recommendations | technique_scores | T1078.004 | Cloud Accounts |
Comments
This control's "Deprecated accounts should be removed from your subscription" and "Deprecated accounts with owner permissions should be removed from your subscription" recommendation can lead to removing accounts that should not be utilized from your subscriptions thereby denying adversaries the usage of these accounts to find ways to access your data without being noticed.
Likewise, the recommendations related to External account permissions can also mitigate this sub-technique.
Because these are recommendations and only limited to deprecated and external accounts, this is scored as Minimal.
References
|
alerts_for_azure_cosmos_db | Alerts for Azure Cosmos DB | technique_scores | T1078.004 | Cloud Accounts |
Comments
This control triggers an alert when there is a change in the access pattern to an Azure Cosmos account based on access from an unusual geographical location. False positives are fairly likely and misuse from a typical location is not covered, so score is Minimal. Relevant alert is "Access from an unusual location to a Cosmos DB account"
References
|
azure_policy | Azure Policy | technique_scores | T1078.004 | Cloud Accounts |
Comments
This control may provide recommendations to audit and restrict privileges on Azure cloud accounts. This control may provide information to reduce surface area for privileged access to Azure.
References
|
azure_role_based_access_control | Azure Role-Based Access Control | technique_scores | T1078.004 | Cloud Accounts |
Comments
This control can be used to implement the least-privilege principle for account management and thereby limit what an adversary can do with a valid account.
References
|
Capability ID | Capability Description | Mapping Type | ATT&CK ID | ATT&CK Name | Notes |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
advanced_protection_program | Advanced Protection Program | technique_scores | T1078.004 | Cloud Accounts |
Comments
Advanced Protection Program enables the use of a security key for multi-factor authentication. Integrating multi-factor authentication (MFA) as part of organizational policy can greatly reduce the risk of an adversary gaining control of valid credentials that may be used for additional tactics such as initial access, lateral movement, and collecting information.
References
|
cloud_asset_inventory | Cloud Asset Inventory | technique_scores | T1078.004 | Cloud Accounts |
Comments
This control may be able to detect when adversaries use valid cloud accounts to elevate privileges through manipulation of IAM or access policies. This monitoring can be fine tuned to specific assets, policies, and organizations.
References
|
cloud_identity | Cloud Identity | technique_scores | T1078.004 | Cloud Accounts |
Comments
This control can be used to mitigate malicious attacks of cloud accounts by implementing multi-factor authentication techniques or password policies.
References
|
gke_enterprise | GKE Enterprise | technique_scores | T1078.004 | Cloud Accounts |
Comments
GKE Enterprise incorporates the Anthos Config Management feature to create and manage Kubernetes objects across multiple clusters at once. PodSecurityPolicies can be enforced to prevent Pods from using the root Linux user. Based on the medium detection coverage, this sub-technique was scored as partial.
References
|
identity_and_access_management | Identity and Access Management | technique_scores | T1078.004 | Cloud Accounts |
Comments
This control protects against malicious use of cloud accounts and gaining access to them. This control may mitigate the impact of compromised valid accounts by enabling fine-grained access policies and implementing least-privilege policies. MFA can provide protection against an adversary that obtains valid credentials by requiring the adversary to complete an additional authentication process before access is permitted.
References
|
identity_aware_proxy | Identity Aware Proxy | technique_scores | T1078.004 | Cloud Accounts |
Comments
Protects access to applications hosted within cloud and other premises.
References
|
identity_platform | Identity Platform | technique_scores | T1078.004 | Cloud Accounts |
Comments
Identity Platform lets you add Google-grade authentication to your apps and services, making it easier to secure user accounts and securely managing credentials. MFA can provide protection against an adversary that obtains valid credentials by requiring the adversary to complete an additional authentication process before access is permitted.
References
|
policy_intelligence | Policy Intelligence | technique_scores | T1078.004 | Cloud Accounts |
Comments
Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a cloud account by gaining access through means of Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Policy Intelligence role recommendations generated by IAM Recommender help enforce least privilege principals to ensure that permission levels are properly managed.
References
|
recaptcha_enterprise | ReCAPTCHA Enterprise | technique_scores | T1078.004 | Cloud Accounts |
Comments
ReCAPTCHA Enterprise allows users to configure Multifactor Authentication (MFA) to verify user's identity by sending a verification code by email or SMS (known as an MFA challenge). When ReCAPTCHA Enterprise assesses that user activity to exceeds a predetermined threshold (by the developer), it can trigger an MFA challenge to verify the user. This increases the likelihood that a compromised account will be prevented from impacting the system.
Since ReCAPTCHA Enterprise does not require a MFA challenge for all user activity, it has been given a rating of Partial.
References
|
resource_manager | Resource Manager | technique_scores | T1078.004 | Cloud Accounts |
Comments
Adversaries may attempt to obtain credentials of existing account through privilege escalation or defense evasion. IAM audit logging in GCP can be used to determine roles and permissions, along with routinely checking user permissions to ensure only the expected users have the ability to list IAM identities or otherwise discover cloud accounts.
References
|
security_command_center | Security Command Center | technique_scores | T1078.004 | Cloud Accounts |
Comments
SCC ingests Cloud Audit logs to detect when an external member is added to a privileged group with sensitive permissions or roles. This security solution protects against compromised cloud accounts used to maintain persistence and harvest sensitive data. Because of the near-real time temporal factor to detect against this cyber-attack the control was graded as significant.
References
|
Capability ID | Capability Description | Mapping Type | ATT&CK ID | ATT&CK Name | Notes |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
amazon_cognito | Amazon Cognito | technique_scores | T1078.004 | Cloud Accounts |
Comments
Amazon Cognito has the ability to alert and block accounts where credentials were found to be compromised elsewhere (compromised credential protection). The service also detects unusual sign-in activity, such as sign-in attempts from new locations and devices and can either prompt users for additional verification or block the sign-in request. There was insufficient detail on the operation of these capabilities and therefore a conservative assessment of a Partial score has been assigned.
References
|
amazon_guardduty | Amazon GuardDuty | technique_scores | T1078.004 | Cloud Accounts |
Comments
Listed findings above flag instances where there are indications of account compromise.
References
|
aws_config | AWS Config | technique_scores | T1078.004 | Cloud Accounts |
Comments
The following AWS Config managed rules can identify configuration problems that should be fixed in order to ensure multi-factor authentication (MFA) is enabled properly, which can provide protection against attempted misuse of cloud accounts: "iam-user-mfa-enabled", "mfa-enabled-for-iam-console-access", "root-account-hardware-mfa-enabled", and "root-account-mfa-enabled". All of these controls are run periodically.
The following AWS Config managed rules can identify configuration problems that should be fixed in order to ensure that appropriate AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM) policies are in place to enforce fine-grained access policies and mitigate the impact of compromised valid accounts: "iam-customer-policy-blocked-kms-actions", "iam-inline-policy-blocked-kms-actions", "iam-no-inline-policy-check", "iam-group-has-users-check", "iam-policy-blacklisted-check", "iam-policy-no-statements-with-admin-access", "iam-policy-no-statements-with-full-access", "iam-role-managed-policy-check", "iam-user-group-membership-check", "iam-user-no-policies-check", and "ec2-instance-profile-attached" are run on configuration changes. "iam-password-policy", "iam-policy-in-use", "iam-root-access-key-check", "iam-user-mfa-enabled", "iam-user-unused-credentials-check", and "mfa-enabled-for-iam-console-access" are run periodically. The "access-keys-rotated" managed rule ensures that IAM access keys are rotated at an appropriate rate.
Given that these rules provide robust coverage for a variety of IAM configuration problems and most are evaluated on configuration changes, they result in an overall score of Significant.
References
|
aws_identity_and_access_management | AWS Identity and Access Management | technique_scores | T1078.004 | Cloud Accounts |
Comments
This control may mitigate the impact of compromised valid accounts by enabling fine-grained access policies and implementing least-privilege policies. MFA can provide protection against an adversary that obtains valid credentials by requiring the adversary to complete an additional authentication process before access is permitted.
References
|
aws_identity_and_access_management | AWS Identity and Access Management | technique_scores | T1078.004 | Cloud Accounts |
Comments
The Access Analyzer tool may detect when an external entity has been granted access to cloud resources through use of access policies. This tool will scan upon any change to access policies or periodically within 24 hours.
References
|
aws_iot_device_defender | AWS IoT Device Defender | technique_scores | T1078.004 | Cloud Accounts |
Comments
The following AWS IoT Device Defender audit checks can identify potentially malicious use of valid cloud credentials by AWS IoT devices, which may indicate that devices have been compromised: "CA certificate revoked but device certificates still active" ("REVOKED_CA_CERTIFICATE_STILL_ACTIVE_CHECK" in the CLI and API) indicates that device certificates signed using a revoked CA certificate are still active, which may indicate that devices using those certificates are controlled by an adversary if the CA certificate was revoked due to compromise. "Device certificate shared" ("DEVICE_CERTIFICATE_SHARED_CHECK" in the CLI and API), "Revoked device certificate still active" ("REVOKED_DEVICE_CERTIFICATE_STILL_ACTIVE_CHECK" in the CLI and API), and "Conflicting MQTT client IDs" ("CONFLICTING_CLIENT_IDS_CHECK" in the CLI and API) can indicate that devices are in use with duplicate certificates and/or IDs and/or certificates that have been revoked due to compromise, all of which suggest that an adversary may be using clones of compromised devices to leverage their access.
The following AWS IoT Device Defender cloud-side detection metrics can identify potentially malicious use of valid cloud credentials by IoT devices, which may indicate that devices have been compromised: "Source IP" ("aws:source-ip-address") values outside of expected IP address ranges may suggest that a device has been stolen. "Authorization failures" ("aws:num-authorization-failures") counts above a typical threshold may indicate that a compromised device is attempting to use its connection to AWS IoT to access resources for which it does not have access and being denied. High counts for "Disconnects" ("aws:num-disconnects"), especially in conjunction with high counts for "Connection attempts" ("aws:num-connection-attempts"), which include successful attempts, may indicate that a compromised device is connecting and disconnecting from AWS IoT using the device's associated access.
Coverage factor is partial for these metrics, checks, and mitigations, since they are specific to use of cloud accounts for AWS IoT access and actions, resulting in an overall score of Partial.
References
|
aws_iot_device_defender | AWS IoT Device Defender | technique_scores | T1078.004 | Cloud Accounts |
Comments
The following AWS IoT Device Defender audit checks and corresponding mitigation actions can identify and in some cases resolve configuration problems that should be fixed in order to limit the potential impact of compromised accounts with access to AWS IoT resources: The "Authenticated Cognito role overly permissive" ("AUTHENTICATED_COGNITO_ROLE_OVERLY_PERMISSIVE_CHECK" in the CLI and API) audit check can identify policies which grant excessive privileges and permissions for AWS IoT actions to Amazon Cognito identity pool roles. The "Unauthenticated Cognito role overly permissive" ("UNAUTHENTICATED_COGNITO_ROLE_OVERLY_PERMISSIVE_CHECK" in the CLI and API) audit check can identify policies which grant excessive privileges and permissions for AWS IoT actions to Amazon Cognito identity pool roles and do not require authentication, which pose a substantial risk because they can be trivially accessed. The "AWS IoT policies overly permissive" ("IOT_POLICY_OVERLY_PERMISSIVE_CHECK" in the CLI and API) audit check can identify AWS IoT policies which grant excessive privileges and permissions for AWS IoT actions and supports the "REPLACE_DEFAULT_POLICY_VERSION" mitigation action which can reduce permissions to limit potential misuse. The "Role alias allows access to unused services" ("IOT_ROLE_ALIAS_ALLOWS_ACCESS_TO_UNUSED_SERVICES_CHECK" in the CLI and API) and "Role alias overly permissive" ("IOT_ROLE_ALIAS_OVERLY_PERMISSIVE_CHECK" in the CLI and API) audit checks can identify AWS IoT role aliases which allow connected devices to authenticate using their certificates and obtain short-lived AWS credentials from an associated IAM role which grant permissions and privileges beyond those necessary to the devices' functions and should be fixed in order to prevent further account compromise from compromised devices.
Coverage factor is partial for these checks and mitigations, since they are specific to use of cloud accounts for AWS IoT access and actions, resulting in an overall score of Partial.
References
|
aws_organizations | AWS Organizations | technique_scores | T1078.004 | Cloud Accounts |
Comments
This control may protect against malicious use of cloud accounts by implementing service control policies that define what actions an account may take. If best practices are followed, AWS accounts should only have the least amount of privileges required.
References
|
aws_security_hub | AWS Security Hub | technique_scores | T1078.004 | Cloud Accounts |
Comments
AWS Security Hub detects suspicious activity by AWS accounts which could indicate valid accounts being leveraged by an adversary. AWS Security Hub provides these detections with the following managed insights.
AWS principals with suspicious access key activity Credentials that may have leaked AWS resources with unauthorized access attempts IAM users with suspicious activity
AWS Security Hub also performs checks from the AWS Foundations CIS Benchmark and PCI-DSS security standard that, if implemented, would help towards detecting the misuse of valid accounts. AWS Security Hub provides these detections with the following checks.
3.1 Ensure a log metric filter and alarm exist for unauthorized API calls 3.2 Ensure a log metric filter and alarm exist for Management Console sign-in without MFA 3.3 Ensure a log metric filter and alarm exist for usage of "root" account 3.4 Ensure a log metric filter and alarm exist for IAM policy changes 3.6 Ensure a log metric filter and alarm exist for AWS Management Console authentication failures [PCI.CW.1] A log metric filter and alarm should exist for usage of the "root" user
By monitoring the root account, activity where accounts make unauthorized API calls, and changes to IAM permissions among other things, it may be possible to detect valid accounts that are being misused and are potentially compromised.
This is scored as Significant because it reports on suspicious activity by AWS accounts.
References
|
aws_single_sign-on | AWS Single Sign-On | technique_scores | T1078.004 | Cloud Accounts |
Comments
This control may protect against malicious use of valid accounts by implementing fine grained and least privilege access through use of permission sets (a collection of administrator-defined policies that AWS SSO uses to determine a user's effective permissions to access a given AWS account). The ability to reduce the set of credentials and accounts needed for a user allows for simpler and safer access and privilege management.
References
|
Capability ID | Capability Description | Mapping Type | ATT&CK ID | ATT&CK Name | Notes |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
EID-CA-E3 | Conditional Access | Technique Scores | T1078.004 | Cloud Accounts |
Comments
This control can protect against the abuse of valid cloud accounts by requiring MFA or blocking access altogether based on signals such as the user's IP location information, device compliance state, risky sign-in/user state (through integration with Azure AD Identity Protection). Additionally, session controls that can limit what a valid user can do within an app can also be triggered based on the aforementioned triggers.
References
|
EID-CA-E3 | Conditional Access | Technique Scores | T1078.004 | Cloud Accounts |
Comments
This control can protect against the abuse of valid cloud accounts by requiring MFA or blocking access altogether based on signals such as the user's IP location information, device compliance state, risky sign-in/user state (through integration with Azure AD Identity Protection). Additionally, session controls that can limit what a valid user can do within an app can also be triggered based on the aforementioned triggers.
References
|
EID-CA-E3 | Conditional Access | Technique Scores | T1078.004 | Cloud Accounts |
Comments
Security controls like Azure AD Identity Protection can raise a user's risk level asynchronously after they have used a valid account to access organizational data. This CAE control can respond to this change in the users risky state to terminate the user's access within minutes or enforce an additional authentication method such as MFA. This mitigates the impact of an adversary using a valid account. This is control only forces the user to re-authenticate and doesn't resolve the usage of a valid account (i.e. password change) and is therefore a containment type of response.
References
|
EID-CA-E3 | Conditional Access | Technique Scores | T1078.004 | Cloud Accounts |
Comments
Security controls like Azure AD Identity Protection can raise a user's risk level asynchronously after they have used a valid account to access organizational data. This CAE control can respond to this change in the users risky state to terminate the user's access within minutes or enforce an additional authentication method such as MFA. This mitigates the impact of an adversary using a valid account. This is control only forces the user to re-authenticate and doesn't resolve the usage of a valid account (i.e. password change) and is therefore a containment type of response.
References
|
PUR-AUS-E5 | Audit Solutions | Technique Scores | T1078.004 | Cloud Accounts |
Comments
Microsoft Purview auditing solutions provide an integrated solution to help organizations effectively respond to security events, forensic investigations, internal investigations, and compliance obligations. Thousands of user and admin operations performed in dozens of Microsoft 365 services and solutions are captured, recorded, and retained in your organization's unified audit log. Audit records for these events are searchable by security ops, IT admins, insider risk teams, and compliance and legal investigators in your organization. This capability provides visibility into the activities performed across your Microsoft 365 organization.
Microsoft's Audit Solutions protects from Cloud Account attacks due to Audit Solutions providing the visibility to allow admins to regularly audit user accounts for activity and deactivate or remove any that are no longer needed.
License Requirements:
Microsoft 365 E3 and E5
References
|
DEF-CAPP-E5 | Defender for Cloud Apps | Technique Scores | T1078.004 | Cloud Accounts |
Comments
This control can identify anomalous behavior such as geographically impossible logins and out-of-character activity.
Relevant alerts include "Activity from anonymous IP address" , "Activity from infrequent country", "Activity from suspicious IP address", "Impossible Travel", and "Activity performed by terminated user".
References
|
DEF-SSCO-E3 | Secure Score | Technique Scores | T1078.004 | Cloud Accounts |
Comments
Microsoft Secure Score is a measurement of an organization's security posture, with a higher number indicating more recommended actions taken. It can be found at Microsoft Secure Score in the Microsoft Defender portal.
Following the Secure Score recommendations can protect your organization from threats. From a centralized dashboard in the Microsoft Defender portal, organizations can monitor and work on the security of their Microsoft 365 identities, apps, and devices. Your score is updated in real time to reflect the information presented in the visualizations and recommended action pages. Secure Score also syncs daily to receive system data about your achieved points for each action.
To help you find the information you need more quickly, Microsoft recommended actions are organized into groups:
Identity (Microsoft Entra accounts & roles)
Device (Microsoft Defender for Endpoint, known as Microsoft Secure Score for Devices)
Apps (email and cloud apps, including Office 365 and Microsoft Defender for Cloud Apps)
Data (through Microsoft Information Protection)
References
|
EID-PWLA-E3 | Passwordless Authentication | Technique Scores | T1078.004 | Cloud Accounts |
Comments
Microsoft recommended the use of Passwordless authentication. This method provides the most secure MFA sign-in process by replacing the password with something you have, plus something you are or something you know.(e.g., Biometric, FIDO2 security keys, Microsoft’s Authenticator app).
When combined with Conditional Access policies, Passwordless Authentication can significantly protect against the likelihood of adversary activity from credential attacks (e.g., brute force, token theft, etc.).
License Requirements:
All Microsoft Entra ID licenses
References
|
EID-IDPR-E5 | ID Protection | Technique Scores | T1078.004 | Cloud Accounts |
Comments
This control provides risk detections that can be used to detect suspicious uses of valid accounts, e.g.: Anonymous IP address, Atypical travel, Malware linked IP address, Unfamiliar sign-in properties, etc. Microsoft utilizes machine learning and heuristic systems to reduce the false positive rate but there will be false positives.
The temporal factor of this control's detection is low because although there are some real-time detections most are offline detections (multi-day).
References
|
EID-IDPR-E5 | ID Protection | Technique Scores | T1078.004 | Cloud Accounts |
Comments
Response Type: Eradication
Supports blocking and resetting the user's credentials based on the detection of a risky user/sign-in manually and also supports automation via its user and sign-in risk policies.
References
|
EID-IDSS-E3 | Identity Secure Score | Technique Scores | T1078.004 | Cloud Accounts |
Comments
This control's "Require MFA for administrative roles" and "Ensure all users can complete multi-factor authentication for secure access" recommendations of MFA can provide protection against an adversary that obtains valid credentials by requiring the adversary to complete an additional authentication process before access is permitted. See the mapping for MFA for more details.
This control's "Use limited administrative roles" recommendation recommends reviewing and limiting the number of accounts with global admin privilege, reducing what an adversary can do with a compromised valid account.
Because these are recommendations and do not actually enforce the protections, the assessed score is capped at Partial.
References
|
EID-IDSS-E3 | Identity Secure Score | Technique Scores | T1078.004 | Cloud Accounts |
Comments
This control's "Turn on sign-in risk policy" and "Turn on user risk policy" recommendations recommend enabling Azure AD Identity Protection which can lead to detecting adversary usage of valid accounts. See the mapping for Azure AD Identity Protection.
References
|
DEF-AIR-E5 | Automated Investigation and Response | Technique Scores | T1078.004 | Cloud Accounts |
Comments
Microsoft Defender for Office 365 includes powerful automated investigation and response (AIR) capabilities that can save your security operations team time and effort. As alerts are triggered, it's up to your security operations team to review, prioritize, and respond to those alerts. Keeping up with the volume of incoming alerts can be overwhelming. Automating some of those tasks can help.
AIR enables your security operations team to operate more efficiently and effectively. AIR capabilities include automated investigation processes in response to well-known threats that exist today. Appropriate remediation actions await approval, enabling your security operations team to respond effectively to detected threats. With AIR, your security operations team can focus on higher-priority tasks without losing sight of important alerts that are triggered. Examples include: Soft delete email messages or clusters, Block URL (time-of-click), Turn off external mail forwarding, Turn off delegation, etc.
Required licenses
E5 or Microsoft Defender for Office 365 Plan 2 licenses.
References
|
EID-RBAC-E3 | Role Based Access Control | Technique Scores | T1078.004 | Cloud Accounts |
Comments
The RBAC control can be used to implement the principle of least privilege for account management, reducing the available actions an adversary can perform with a cloud account. This scores Partial for its ability to minimize the overall accounts with management privileges.
License Requirements:
ME-ID Built-in Roles (Free)
References
|
DEF-ATH-E5 | Advanced Threat Hunting | Technique Scores | T1078.004 | Cloud Accounts |
Comments
Advanced hunting is a query-based threat hunting tool that lets you explore up to 30 days of raw data. Advanced hunting in Microsoft Defender XDR allows you to proactively hunt for threats across: Devices managed by Microsoft Defender for Endpoint, Emails processed by Microsoft 365, Cloud app activities, authentication events, and domain controller activities. With this level of visibility, you can quickly hunt for threats that traverse sections of your network, including sophisticated intrusions that arrive on email or the web, elevate local privileges, acquire privileged domain credentials, and move laterally to across your devices. Advanced hunting supports two modes, guided and advanced. Users use advanced mode if they are comfortable using Kusto Query Language (KQL) to create queries from scratch.
Advanced Threat Hunting Detects Cloud Account attacks due to the IdentityLogonEvents table in the advanced hunting schema which contains information about all authentication activities related to Microsoft online services captured by Microsoft Defender for Cloud Apps.
License Requirements:
Microsoft Defender XDR, Microsoft Defender for Cloud Apps, Microsoft Defender for Office 365 plan 2
References
|
DEF-LM-E5 | Lateral Movements | Technique Scores | T1078.004 | Cloud Accounts |
Comments
Defender for Identity LMPs are visual guides that help you quickly understand and identify exactly how attackers can move laterally inside your network. The purpose of lateral movements within the cyber-attack kill chain are for attackers to gain and compromise your sensitive accounts using non-sensitive accounts. Compromising your sensitive accounts gets them another step closer to their ultimate goal, domain dominance. To stop these attacks from being successful, Defender for Identity LMPs give you easy to interpret, direct visual guidance on your most vulnerable, sensitive accounts.
References
|
DEF-APGV-E5 | App Governance | Technique Scores | T1078.004 | Cloud Accounts |
Comments
App governance in Defender for Cloud Apps is a set of security and policy management capabilities designed for OAuth-enabled apps registered on Microsoft Entra ID, Google, and Salesforce. App governance delivers visibility, remediation, and governance into how these apps and their users access, use, and share sensitive data in Microsoft 365 and other cloud platforms through actionable insights and automated policy alerts and actions. App governance also enables you to see which user-installed OAuth applications have access to data on Microsoft 365, Google Workspace, and Salesforce. It tells you what permissions the apps have and which users have granted access to their accounts. App governance insights enable you to make informed decisions around blocking or restricting apps that present significant risk to your organization
App Governance Detects Cloud Account attacks due to App Governance monitoring aggregated sign-in activity for each app and tracking all risky sign-in's.
License Requirements:
Microsoft Defender for Cloud Apps
References
|
EID-MFA-E3 | Multifactor Authentication | Technique Scores | T1078.004 | Cloud Accounts |
Comments
MFA can provide protection against an adversary that obtains valid credentials by requiring the adversary to complete an additional authentication process before access is permitted. This is an incomplete protection measure though as the adversary may also have obtained credentials enabling bypassing the additional authentication method.
References
|
EID-MFA-E3 | Multifactor Authentication | Technique Scores | T1078.004 | Cloud Accounts |
Comments
Requiring the use of MFA for all users can significantly reduce the likelihood of adversaries gaining access to the environment's cloud accounts.
References
|
EID-PIM-E5 | Privileged Identity Management | Technique Scores | T1078.004 | Cloud Accounts |
Comments
This control's Access Review feature supports scheduling a routine review of cloud account permission levels to look for those that could allow an adversary to gain wide access. This information can then be used to validate if such access is required and identify which (privileged) accounts should be monitored closely. This reduces the availability of valid accounts to adversaries. This review would normally be scheduled periodically, at most weekly, and therefore its temporal score is Partial.
References
|
EID-PIM-E5 | Privileged Identity Management | Technique Scores | T1078.004 | Cloud Accounts |
Comments
The PIM control supports an Access Review feature, which can be created to review privileged access to avoid stale role assignments. Access Reviews can be scheduled routinely, and used to help evaluate the state of privileged access. Performing this review can help minimize the availability of valid accounts to adversaries. Although this review can be scheduled periodically, it would not occur at real-time frequency, and is therefore assigned Partial.
License Requirements:
Microsoft Entra ID P2 or Microsoft Entra ID Governance
References
|