T1078.004 Cloud Accounts Mappings

Valid accounts in cloud environments may allow adversaries to perform actions to achieve Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Cloud accounts are those created and configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration of resources within a cloud service provider or SaaS application. Cloud Accounts can exist solely in the cloud; alternatively, they may be hybrid-joined between on-premises systems and the cloud through syncing or federation with other identity sources such as Windows Active Directory. (Citation: AWS Identity Federation)(Citation: Google Federating GC)(Citation: Microsoft Deploying AD Federation)

Service or user accounts may be targeted by adversaries through Brute Force, Phishing, or various other means to gain access to the environment. Federated or synced accounts may be a pathway for the adversary to affect both on-premises systems and cloud environments - for example, by leveraging shared credentials to log onto Remote Services. High privileged cloud accounts, whether federated, synced, or cloud-only, may also allow pivoting to on-premises environments by leveraging SaaS-based Software Deployment Tools to run commands on hybrid-joined devices.

An adversary may create long lasting Additional Cloud Credentials on a compromised cloud account to maintain persistence in the environment. Such credentials may also be used to bypass security controls such as multi-factor authentication.

Cloud accounts may also be able to assume Temporary Elevated Cloud Access or other privileges through various means within the environment. Misconfigurations in role assignments or role assumption policies may allow an adversary to use these mechanisms to leverage permissions outside the intended scope of the account. Such over privileged accounts may be used to harvest sensitive data from online storage accounts and databases through Cloud API or other methods.

View in MITRE ATT&CK®

VERIS Mappings

Capability ID Capability Description Mapping Type ATT&CK ID ATT&CK Name Notes
action.hacking.variety.Use of stolen creds Use of stolen or default authentication credentials (including credential stuffing) related-to T1078.004 Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts

AWS Mappings

Capability ID Capability Description Mapping Type ATT&CK ID ATT&CK Name Notes
amazon_cognito Amazon Cognito technique_scores T1078.004 Cloud Accounts
Comments
Amazon Cognito has the ability to alert and block accounts where credentials were found to be compromised elsewhere (compromised credential protection). The service also detects unusual sign-in activity, such as sign-in attempts from new locations and devices and can either prompt users for additional verification or block the sign-in request. There was insufficient detail on the operation of these capabilities and therefore a conservative assessment of a Partial score has been assigned.
References
    amazon_guardduty Amazon GuardDuty technique_scores T1078.004 Cloud Accounts
    Comments
    Listed findings above flag instances where there are indications of account compromise.
    References
      aws_config AWS Config technique_scores T1078.004 Cloud Accounts
      Comments
      The following AWS Config managed rules can identify configuration problems that should be fixed in order to ensure multi-factor authentication (MFA) is enabled properly, which can provide protection against attempted misuse of cloud accounts: "iam-user-mfa-enabled", "mfa-enabled-for-iam-console-access", "root-account-hardware-mfa-enabled", and "root-account-mfa-enabled". All of these controls are run periodically. The following AWS Config managed rules can identify configuration problems that should be fixed in order to ensure that appropriate AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM) policies are in place to enforce fine-grained access policies and mitigate the impact of compromised valid accounts: "iam-customer-policy-blocked-kms-actions", "iam-inline-policy-blocked-kms-actions", "iam-no-inline-policy-check", "iam-group-has-users-check", "iam-policy-blacklisted-check", "iam-policy-no-statements-with-admin-access", "iam-policy-no-statements-with-full-access", "iam-role-managed-policy-check", "iam-user-group-membership-check", "iam-user-no-policies-check", and "ec2-instance-profile-attached" are run on configuration changes. "iam-password-policy", "iam-policy-in-use", "iam-root-access-key-check", "iam-user-mfa-enabled", "iam-user-unused-credentials-check", and "mfa-enabled-for-iam-console-access" are run periodically. The "access-keys-rotated" managed rule ensures that IAM access keys are rotated at an appropriate rate. Given that these rules provide robust coverage for a variety of IAM configuration problems and most are evaluated on configuration changes, they result in an overall score of Significant.
      References
        aws_identity_and_access_management AWS Identity and Access Management technique_scores T1078.004 Cloud Accounts
        Comments
        This control may mitigate the impact of compromised valid accounts by enabling fine-grained access policies and implementing least-privilege policies. MFA can provide protection against an adversary that obtains valid credentials by requiring the adversary to complete an additional authentication process before access is permitted.
        References
          aws_identity_and_access_management AWS Identity and Access Management technique_scores T1078.004 Cloud Accounts
          Comments
          The Access Analyzer tool may detect when an external entity has been granted access to cloud resources through use of access policies. This tool will scan upon any change to access policies or periodically within 24 hours.
          References
            aws_iot_device_defender AWS IoT Device Defender technique_scores T1078.004 Cloud Accounts
            Comments
            The following AWS IoT Device Defender audit checks can identify potentially malicious use of valid cloud credentials by AWS IoT devices, which may indicate that devices have been compromised: "CA certificate revoked but device certificates still active" ("REVOKED_CA_CERTIFICATE_STILL_ACTIVE_CHECK" in the CLI and API) indicates that device certificates signed using a revoked CA certificate are still active, which may indicate that devices using those certificates are controlled by an adversary if the CA certificate was revoked due to compromise. "Device certificate shared" ("DEVICE_CERTIFICATE_SHARED_CHECK" in the CLI and API), "Revoked device certificate still active" ("REVOKED_DEVICE_CERTIFICATE_STILL_ACTIVE_CHECK" in the CLI and API), and "Conflicting MQTT client IDs" ("CONFLICTING_CLIENT_IDS_CHECK" in the CLI and API) can indicate that devices are in use with duplicate certificates and/or IDs and/or certificates that have been revoked due to compromise, all of which suggest that an adversary may be using clones of compromised devices to leverage their access. The following AWS IoT Device Defender cloud-side detection metrics can identify potentially malicious use of valid cloud credentials by IoT devices, which may indicate that devices have been compromised: "Source IP" ("aws:source-ip-address") values outside of expected IP address ranges may suggest that a device has been stolen. "Authorization failures" ("aws:num-authorization-failures") counts above a typical threshold may indicate that a compromised device is attempting to use its connection to AWS IoT to access resources for which it does not have access and being denied. High counts for "Disconnects" ("aws:num-disconnects"), especially in conjunction with high counts for "Connection attempts" ("aws:num-connection-attempts"), which include successful attempts, may indicate that a compromised device is connecting and disconnecting from AWS IoT using the device's associated access. Coverage factor is partial for these metrics, checks, and mitigations, since they are specific to use of cloud accounts for AWS IoT access and actions, resulting in an overall score of Partial.
            References
              aws_iot_device_defender AWS IoT Device Defender technique_scores T1078.004 Cloud Accounts
              Comments
              The following AWS IoT Device Defender audit checks and corresponding mitigation actions can identify and in some cases resolve configuration problems that should be fixed in order to limit the potential impact of compromised accounts with access to AWS IoT resources: The "Authenticated Cognito role overly permissive" ("AUTHENTICATED_COGNITO_ROLE_OVERLY_PERMISSIVE_CHECK" in the CLI and API) audit check can identify policies which grant excessive privileges and permissions for AWS IoT actions to Amazon Cognito identity pool roles. The "Unauthenticated Cognito role overly permissive" ("UNAUTHENTICATED_COGNITO_ROLE_OVERLY_PERMISSIVE_CHECK" in the CLI and API) audit check can identify policies which grant excessive privileges and permissions for AWS IoT actions to Amazon Cognito identity pool roles and do not require authentication, which pose a substantial risk because they can be trivially accessed. The "AWS IoT policies overly permissive" ("IOT_POLICY_OVERLY_PERMISSIVE_CHECK" in the CLI and API) audit check can identify AWS IoT policies which grant excessive privileges and permissions for AWS IoT actions and supports the "REPLACE_DEFAULT_POLICY_VERSION" mitigation action which can reduce permissions to limit potential misuse. The "Role alias allows access to unused services" ("IOT_ROLE_ALIAS_ALLOWS_ACCESS_TO_UNUSED_SERVICES_CHECK" in the CLI and API) and "Role alias overly permissive" ("IOT_ROLE_ALIAS_OVERLY_PERMISSIVE_CHECK" in the CLI and API) audit checks can identify AWS IoT role aliases which allow connected devices to authenticate using their certificates and obtain short-lived AWS credentials from an associated IAM role which grant permissions and privileges beyond those necessary to the devices' functions and should be fixed in order to prevent further account compromise from compromised devices. Coverage factor is partial for these checks and mitigations, since they are specific to use of cloud accounts for AWS IoT access and actions, resulting in an overall score of Partial.
              References
                aws_organizations AWS Organizations technique_scores T1078.004 Cloud Accounts
                Comments
                This control may protect against malicious use of cloud accounts by implementing service control policies that define what actions an account may take. If best practices are followed, AWS accounts should only have the least amount of privileges required.
                References
                  aws_security_hub AWS Security Hub technique_scores T1078.004 Cloud Accounts
                  Comments
                  AWS Security Hub detects suspicious activity by AWS accounts which could indicate valid accounts being leveraged by an adversary. AWS Security Hub provides these detections with the following managed insights. AWS principals with suspicious access key activity Credentials that may have leaked AWS resources with unauthorized access attempts IAM users with suspicious activity AWS Security Hub also performs checks from the AWS Foundations CIS Benchmark and PCI-DSS security standard that, if implemented, would help towards detecting the misuse of valid accounts. AWS Security Hub provides these detections with the following checks. 3.1 Ensure a log metric filter and alarm exist for unauthorized API calls 3.2 Ensure a log metric filter and alarm exist for Management Console sign-in without MFA 3.3 Ensure a log metric filter and alarm exist for usage of "root" account 3.4 Ensure a log metric filter and alarm exist for IAM policy changes 3.6 Ensure a log metric filter and alarm exist for AWS Management Console authentication failures [PCI.CW.1] A log metric filter and alarm should exist for usage of the "root" user By monitoring the root account, activity where accounts make unauthorized API calls, and changes to IAM permissions among other things, it may be possible to detect valid accounts that are being misused and are potentially compromised. This is scored as Significant because it reports on suspicious activity by AWS accounts.
                  References
                    aws_single_sign-on AWS Single Sign-On technique_scores T1078.004 Cloud Accounts
                    Comments
                    This control may protect against malicious use of valid accounts by implementing fine grained and least privilege access through use of permission sets (a collection of administrator-defined policies that AWS SSO uses to determine a user's effective permissions to access a given AWS account). The ability to reduce the set of credentials and accounts needed for a user allows for simpler and safer access and privilege management.
                    References