T1078 Valid Accounts Mappings

Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop.(Citation: volexity_0day_sophos_FW) Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence.

In some cases, adversaries may abuse inactive accounts: for example, those belonging to individuals who are no longer part of an organization. Using these accounts may allow the adversary to evade detection, as the original account user will not be present to identify any anomalous activity taking place on their account.(Citation: CISA MFA PrintNightmare)

The overlap of permissions for local, domain, and cloud accounts across a network of systems is of concern because the adversary may be able to pivot across accounts and systems to reach a high level of access (i.e., domain or enterprise administrator) to bypass access controls set within the enterprise.(Citation: TechNet Credential Theft)

View in MITRE ATT&CK®

NIST 800-53 Mappings

Capability ID Capability Description Mapping Type ATT&CK ID ATT&CK Name Notes
CA-07 Continuous Monitoring mitigates T1078 Valid Accounts
CM-06 Configuration Settings mitigates T1078 Valid Accounts
CM-05 Access Restrictions for Change mitigates T1078 Valid Accounts
IA-05 Authenticator Management mitigates T1078 Valid Accounts
SA-10 Developer Configuration Management mitigates T1078 Valid Accounts
IA-12 Identity Proofing mitigates T1078 Valid Accounts
SA-11 Developer Testing and Evaluation mitigates T1078 Valid Accounts
SA-15 Development Process, Standards, and Tools mitigates T1078 Valid Accounts
SA-17 Developer Security and Privacy Architecture and Design mitigates T1078 Valid Accounts
SA-03 System Development Life Cycle mitigates T1078 Valid Accounts
SA-04 Acquisition Process mitigates T1078 Valid Accounts
IA-13 Identity Providers and Authorization Servers mitigates T1078 Valid Accounts
CA-03 Information Exchange mitigates T1078 Valid Accounts
SC-28 Protection of Information at Rest mitigates T1078 Valid Accounts
RA-05 Vulnerability Monitoring and Scanning mitigates T1078 Valid Accounts
SC-43 Usage Restrictions mitigates T1078 Valid Accounts
SA-08 Security and Privacy Engineering Principles mitigates T1078 Valid Accounts
IA-02 Identification and Authentication (Organizational Users) mitigates T1078 Valid Accounts
CM-07 Least Functionality mitigates T1078 Valid Accounts
SI-04 System Monitoring mitigates T1078 Valid Accounts
AC-02 Account Management mitigates T1078 Valid Accounts
AC-03 Access Enforcement mitigates T1078 Valid Accounts
AC-05 Separation of Duties mitigates T1078 Valid Accounts
AC-06 Least Privilege mitigates T1078 Valid Accounts
SC-07 Boundary Protection mitigates T1078 Valid Accounts

VERIS Mappings

Capability ID Capability Description Mapping Type ATT&CK ID ATT&CK Name Notes
action.hacking.variety.Backdoor Hacking action that creates a backdoor for use. related-to T1078 Valid Accounts
action.hacking.variety.Use of stolen creds Use of stolen or default authentication credentials (including credential stuffing) related-to T1078 Valid Accounts
action.hacking.vector.Backdoor Hacking actions taken through a backdoor. C2 is only used by malware. related-to T1078 Valid Accounts

GCP Mappings

Capability ID Capability Description Mapping Type ATT&CK ID ATT&CK Name Notes
artifact_analysis Artifact Analysis technique_scores T1078 Valid Accounts
Comments
Artifact Analysis scans container images uploaded to Artifact Registry or Container Registry (deprecated) for vulnerabilities that could potentially be used to escalate privileges, such as default accounts with root permissions in Docker containers. Due to the medium threat protection coverage and scan results being available 48 hours after completion, this control was scored as partial.
References
mandiant_digital_threatmon Mandiant Digital Threat Monitoring technique_scores T1078 Valid Accounts
Comments
Mandiant Digital Threat Monitoring continually monitors for compromised credentials and data leaks on both the open and dark web. This control may protect against credential abuse by alerting on leaked credentials. Since this control must depend on accessible sources for dumps, it does not protect against credentials that have been collected for a campaign but never posted, so the score is partial.
References
cloud_asset_inventory Cloud Asset Inventory technique_scores T1078 Valid Accounts
Comments
This control may be able to detect when adversaries use valid cloud accounts to elevate privileges through manipulation of IAM or access policies. This monitoring can be fine tuned to specific assets, policies, and organizations.
References
cloud_endpoints Cloud Endpoints technique_scores T1078 Valid Accounts
Comments
The Cloud Endpoints capability provides support for multiple authentication methods, including API keys and Google ID tokens. Implementing multi-factor authentication (MFA) across account types, including local, domain, and cloud accounts, can prevent unauthorized access even if credentials are compromised.
References
cloud_identity Cloud Identity technique_scores T1078 Valid Accounts
Comments
This control can be used to mitigate malicious attacks of cloud accounts by implementing multi-factor authentication techniques or password policies.
References
gke_enterprise GKE Enterprise technique_scores T1078 Valid Accounts
Comments
GKE Enterprise incorporates the Anthos Config Management feature to create and manage Kubernetes objects across multiple clusters at once. PodSecurityPolicies can be enforced to prevent Pods from using the root Linux user. Based on the medium detection coverage, this was scored as partial.
References
google_secops Google Security Operations technique_scores T1078 Valid Accounts
Comments
Google Security Ops is able to trigger an alert based on RDP logons from non-private IP ranges. This technique was scored as minimal based on low or uncertain detection coverage factor. https://github.com/chronicle/detection-rules/blob/783e0e5947774785db1c55041b70176deeca6f46/soc_prime_rules/active_directory_security/security/remote_desktop_from_internet__via_audit.yaral
References
identity_and_access_management Identity and Access Management technique_scores T1078 Valid Accounts
Comments
This control may mitigate the impact of compromised valid accounts by enabling fine-grained access policies and implementing least-privilege policies. MFA can provide protection against an adversary that obtains valid credentials by requiring the adversary to complete an additional authentication process before access is permitted.
References
identity_aware_proxy Identity Aware Proxy technique_scores T1078 Valid Accounts
Comments
IAP applies the relevant IAM policy to check if the user is authorized to access the requested resource. If the user has the IAP-secured Web App User role on the Cloud console project where the resource exists, they're authorized to access the application. This control can mitigate against adversaries that try to obtain credentials of accounts, including cloud accounts.
References
identity_platform Identity Platform technique_scores T1078 Valid Accounts
Comments
Identity Platform lets you add Google-grade authentication to your apps and services, making it easier to secure user accounts and securely managing credentials. MFA can provide protection against an adversary that obtains valid credentials by requiring the adversary to complete an additional authentication process before access is permitted.
References
policy_intelligence Policy Intelligence technique_scores T1078 Valid Accounts
Comments
Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a cloud account by gaining access through means of Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Policy Intelligence role recommendations generated by IAM Recommender help enforce least privilege principals to ensure that permission levels are properly managed.
References
resource_manager Resource Manager technique_scores T1078 Valid Accounts
Comments
Adversaries may attempt to obtain credentials of existing account through privilege escalation or defense evasion. IAM audit logging in GCP can be used to determine roles and permissions, along with routinely checking user permissions to ensure only the expected users have the ability to list IAM identities or otherwise discover cloud accounts.
References
vpc_service_controls VPC Service Controls technique_scores T1078 Valid Accounts
Comments
This control is able to mitigate against abuse of compromised valid accounts by restricting access from those accounts to resources contained within the VPC perimeter the account belongs to. Resources and services contained in other VPC networks also cannot be accessed by user accounts that are not within the VPC network perimeter.
References

AWS Mappings

Capability ID Capability Description Mapping Type ATT&CK ID ATT&CK Name Notes
amazon_cognito Amazon Cognito technique_scores T1078 Valid Accounts
amazon_guardduty Amazon GuardDuty technique_scores T1078 Valid Accounts
Comments
GuardDuty implements a finding that flags occurrences unattended behavior from an IAM User in the Account. PenTest:IAMUser/KaliLinux, PenTest:IAMUser/ParrotLinux, PenTest:IAMUser/PentooLinux, Policy:IAMUser/RootCredentialUsage, PrivilegeEscalation:IAMUser/AdministrativePermissions, UnauthorizedAccess:IAMUser/ConsoleLogin, UnauthorizedAccess:IAMUser/ConsoleLoginSuccess.B, UnauthorizedAccess:IAMUser/MaliciousIPCaller, UnauthorizedAccess:IAMUser/MaliciousIPCaller.Custom, UnauthorizedAccess:IAMUser/TorIPCaller, Policy:S3/AccountBlockPublicAccessDisabled, Policy:S3/BucketAnonymousAccessGranted, Policy:S3/BucketBlockPublicAccessDisabled, Policy:S3/BucketPublicAccessGranted, CredentialAccess:IAMUser/AnomalousBehavior, DefenseEvasion:IAMUser/AnomalousBehavior, Discovery:IAMUser/AnomalousBehavior, Exfiltration:IAMUser/AnomalousBehavior, Impact:IAMUser/AnomalousBehavior, Persistence:IAMUser/AnomalousBehavior, Recon:IAMUser/MaliciousIPCaller, Recon:IAMUser/MaliciousIPCaller.Custom, UnauthorizedAccess:IAMUser/InstanceCredentialExfiltration
References
aws_config AWS Config technique_scores T1078 Valid Accounts
Comments
This control provides significant coverage for one of this technique's sub-techniques, resulting in an overall score of Minimal.
References
aws_identity_and_access_management AWS Identity and Access Management technique_scores T1078 Valid Accounts
aws_identity_and_access_management AWS Identity and Access Management technique_scores T1078 Valid Accounts
aws_iot_device_defender AWS IoT Device Defender technique_scores T1078 Valid Accounts
aws_iot_device_defender AWS IoT Device Defender technique_scores T1078 Valid Accounts
aws_organizations AWS Organizations technique_scores T1078 Valid Accounts
Comments
This control may protect against malicious use of cloud accounts but may not mitigate exploitation of local, domain, or default accounts present within deployed resources.
References
aws_security_hub AWS Security Hub technique_scores T1078 Valid Accounts
Comments
AWS Security Hub detects suspicious activity by AWS accounts which could indicate valid accounts being leveraged by an adversary. AWS Security Hub provides these detections with the following managed insights. AWS principals with suspicious access key activity Credentials that may have leaked AWS resources with unauthorized access attempts IAM users with suspicious activity AWS Security Hub also performs checks from the AWS Foundations CIS Benchmark and PCI-DSS security standard that, if implemented, would help towards detecting the misuse of valid accounts. AWS Security Hub provides these detections with the following checks. 3.1 Ensure a log metric filter and alarm exist for unauthorized API calls 3.2 Ensure a log metric filter and alarm exist for Management Console sign-in without MFA 3.3 Ensure a log metric filter and alarm exist for usage of "root" account 3.4 Ensure a log metric filter and alarm exist for IAM policy changes 3.6 Ensure a log metric filter and alarm exist for AWS Management Console authentication failures [PCI.CW.1] A log metric filter and alarm should exist for usage of the "root" user By monitoring the root account, activity where accounts make unauthorized API calls, and changes to IAM permissions among other things, it may be possible to detect valid accounts that are being misused and are potentially compromised. This is scored as Minimal because it only supports a subset of the sub-techniques.
References
aws_single_sign-on AWS Single Sign-On technique_scores T1078 Valid Accounts

ATT&CK Subtechniques

Technique ID Technique Name Number of Mappings
T1078.001 Default Accounts 17
T1078.002 Domain Accounts 16
T1078.004 Cloud Accounts 45
T1078.003 Local Accounts 20