Before compromising a victim, adversaries may hijack domains and/or subdomains that can be used during targeting. Domain registration hijacking is the act of changing the registration of a domain name without the permission of the original registrant.(Citation: ICANNDomainNameHijacking) An adversary may gain access to an email account for the person listed as the owner of the domain. The adversary can then claim that they forgot their password in order to make changes to the domain registration. Other possibilities include social engineering a domain registration help desk to gain access to an account or taking advantage of renewal process gaps.
Subdomain hijacking can occur when organizations have DNS entries that point to non-existent or deprovisioned resources. In such cases, an adversary may take control of a subdomain to conduct operations with the benefit of the trust associated with that domain.(Citation: Microsoft Sub Takeover 2020)
View in MITRE ATT&CK®| Capability ID | Capability Description | Mapping Type | ATT&CK ID | ATT&CK Name | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| azure_dns_alias_records | Azure DNS Alias Records | technique_scores | T1584.001 | Domains |
Comments
Alias records prevent dangling references by tightly coupling the life cycle of a DNS record with an Azure resource. For example, consider a DNS record that's qualified as an alias record to point to a public IP address or a Traffic Manager profile. If you delete those underlying resources, the DNS alias record becomes an empty record set. It no longer references the deleted resource. This control is effective for protecting DNS records that resolve to Azure resources but does not offer protection for records pointing to non-Azure resources, resulting in a Partial score.
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| azure_defender_for_app_service | Azure Defender for App Service | technique_scores | T1584.001 | Domains |
Comments
Subdomain hijacking is a focus of this control, and its Dangling DNS detection alert feature is activated when an App Service website is decommissioned and its corresponding DNS entry is not deleted, allowing users to remove those entries before they can be leveraged by an adversary.
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