Adversaries may modify property list files (plist files) to enable other malicious activity, while also potentially evading and bypassing system defenses. macOS applications use plist files, such as the <code>info.plist</code> file, to store properties and configuration settings that inform the operating system how to handle the application at runtime. Plist files are structured metadata in key-value pairs formatted in XML based on Apple's Core Foundation DTD. Plist files can be saved in text or binary format.(Citation: fileinfo plist file description)
Adversaries can modify key-value pairs in plist files to influence system behaviors, such as hiding the execution of an application (i.e. Hidden Window) or running additional commands for persistence (ex: Launch Agent/Launch Daemon or Re-opened Applications).
For example, adversaries can add a malicious application path to the ~/Library/Preferences/com.apple.dock.plist file, which controls apps that appear in the Dock. Adversaries can also modify the <code>LSUIElement</code> key in an application’s <code>info.plist</code> file to run the app in the background. Adversaries can also insert key-value pairs to insert environment variables, such as <code>LSEnvironment</code>, to enable persistence via Dynamic Linker Hijacking.(Citation: wardle chp2 persistence)(Citation: eset_osx_flashback)
| Capability ID | Capability Description | Mapping Type | ATT&CK ID | ATT&CK Name | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| PR.PS-06.01 | Secure SDLC process | Mitigates | T1647 | Plist File Modification |
Comments
This diagnostic statement helps protect the modification of property list files (plist files) through secure development practices, such as enabling hardened runtime.
References
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| PR.PS-06.07 | Development and operational process alignment | Mitigates | T1647 | Plist File Modification |
Comments
This diagnostic statement protects against Plist File Modification through the use of DevSecOps, secure development lifecycle, and application developer guidance. Exploitable weaknesses can be mitigated through secure code, reduced vulnerabilities, and secure design principles.
References
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| Capability ID | Capability Description | Mapping Type | ATT&CK ID | ATT&CK Name | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| google_secops | Google Security Operations | technique_scores | T1647 | Plist File Modification |
Comments
Google Security Operations is able to trigger alerts based on executed commands that modify files where plists are typically located.
References
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