T1611 Escape to Host Mappings

Adversaries may break out of a container to gain access to the underlying host. This can allow an adversary access to other containerized resources from the host level or to the host itself. In principle, containerized resources should provide a clear separation of application functionality and be isolated from the host environment.(Citation: Docker Overview)

There are multiple ways an adversary may escape to a host environment. Examples include creating a container configured to mount the host’s filesystem using the bind parameter, which allows the adversary to drop payloads and execute control utilities such as cron on the host; utilizing a privileged container to run commands or load a malicious kernel module on the underlying host; or abusing system calls such as unshare and keyctl to escalate privileges and steal secrets.(Citation: Docker Bind Mounts)(Citation: Trend Micro Privileged Container)(Citation: Intezer Doki July 20)(Citation: Container Escape)(Citation: Crowdstrike Kubernetes Container Escape)(Citation: Keyctl-unmask)

Additionally, an adversary may be able to exploit a compromised container with a mounted container management socket, such as docker.sock, to break out of the container via a Container Administration Command.(Citation: Container Escape) Adversaries may also escape via Exploitation for Privilege Escalation, such as exploiting vulnerabilities in global symbolic links in order to access the root directory of a host machine.(Citation: Windows Server Containers Are Open)

Gaining access to the host may provide the adversary with the opportunity to achieve follow-on objectives, such as establishing persistence, moving laterally within the environment, accessing other containers running on the host, or setting up a command and control channel on the host.

View in MITRE ATT&CK®

VERIS Mappings

Capability ID Capability Description Mapping Type ATT&CK ID ATT&CK Name Notes
action.hacking.variety.Virtual machine escape Virtual machine escape. Child of 'Exploit vuln'. related-to T1611 Escape to Host

GCP Mappings

Capability ID Capability Description Mapping Type ATT&CK ID ATT&CK Name Notes
gke_enterprise GKE Enterprise technique_scores T1611 Escape to Host
Comments
GKE Enterprise incorporates the Anthos Config Management feature to create and manage Kubernetes objects across multiple clusters at once. PodSecurityPolicies can be enforced to prevent Pods from using the root Linux user and prevents pods from running privileged containers. This control can be used to limit container access to host process namespaces, the host network, and the host file system, which may enable adversaries to break out of containers and gain access to the underlying host.
References
google_kubernetes_engine Google Kubernetes Engine technique_scores T1611 Escape to Host
Comments
By default, GKE nodes use Google's Container-Optimized OS to enhance the security of GKE clusters, including: Read-only filesystem, limited user accounts, and disabled root login.
References
google_kubernetes_engine Google Kubernetes Engine technique_scores T1611 Escape to Host
Comments
GKE provides the ability to audit against a Center for Internet Security (CIS) Benchmark which is a set of recommendations for configuring Kubernetes to support a strong security posture. The Benchmark is tied to a specific Kubernetes release.
References

AWS Mappings

Capability ID Capability Description Mapping Type ATT&CK ID ATT&CK Name Notes
aws_config AWS Config technique_scores T1611 Escape to Host
Comments
The "ecs-task-definition-user-for-host-mode-check" managed rule can identify Amazon Elastic Container Service (ECS) task definitions for containers with host networking mode and 'privileged' or 'user' container definitions, which may enable adversaries to break out of containers and gain access to the underlying host. It is run on configuration changes. Coverage is partial, since adversaries may find other means to escape a container to the underlying host, resulting in an overall score of Partial.
References