Adversaries may poison Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) caches to position themselves between the communication of two or more networked devices. This activity may be used to enable follow-on behaviors such as Network Sniffing or Transmitted Data Manipulation.
The ARP protocol is used to resolve IPv4 addresses to link layer addresses, such as a media access control (MAC) address.(Citation: RFC826 ARP) Devices in a local network segment communicate with each other by using link layer addresses. If a networked device does not have the link layer address of a particular networked device, it may send out a broadcast ARP request to the local network to translate the IP address to a MAC address. The device with the associated IP address directly replies with its MAC address. The networked device that made the ARP request will then use as well as store that information in its ARP cache.
An adversary may passively wait for an ARP request to poison the ARP cache of the requesting device. The adversary may reply with their MAC address, thus deceiving the victim by making them believe that they are communicating with the intended networked device. For the adversary to poison the ARP cache, their reply must be faster than the one made by the legitimate IP address owner. Adversaries may also send a gratuitous ARP reply that maliciously announces the ownership of a particular IP address to all the devices in the local network segment.
The ARP protocol is stateless and does not require authentication. Therefore, devices may wrongly add or update the MAC address of the IP address in their ARP cache.(Citation: Sans ARP Spoofing Aug 2003)(Citation: Cylance Cleaver)
Adversaries may use ARP cache poisoning as a means to intercept network traffic. This activity may be used to collect and/or relay data such as credentials, especially those sent over an insecure, unencrypted protocol.(Citation: Sans ARP Spoofing Aug 2003)
View in MITRE ATT&CK®| Capability ID | Capability Description | Mapping Type | ATT&CK ID | ATT&CK Name | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DE.AE-02.01 | Event analysis and detection | Mitigates | T1557.002 | ARP Cache Poisoning |
Comments
This diagnostic statement provides for implementation of methods to block similar future attacks via security tools such as antivirus and IDS/IPS to provide protection against threats and exploitation attempts.
References
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| PR.DS-01.01 | Data-at-rest protection | Mitigates | T1557.002 | ARP Cache Poisoning |
Comments
This diagnostic statement focuses on protecting data-at-rest by implementing encryption and other security measures such as sandboxing, authentication, segregation, masking, tokenization, and file integrity monitoring.
References
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| DE.CM-01.01 | Intrusion detection and prevention | Mitigates | T1557.002 | ARP Cache Poisoning |
Comments
The use of network intrusion detection and prevention systems can identify and possibly bock traffic patterns, indicative of AiTM activity. If so, these patterns can be mitigated at the network level, enabling to block adversaries from poisoning ARP caches.
References
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| PR.PS-01.06 | Encryption management practices | Mitigates | T1557.002 | ARP Cache Poisoning |
Comments
This diagnostic statement is associated with employing encryption methods to mitigate unauthorized access or theft of data that protect the confidentiality and integrity of data-at-rest, data-in-use, and data-in-transit. To address ARP Cache Poisoning, ensure that all wired and wireless traffic is encrypted appropriately, employs best practices for authentication protocols such as Kerberos, and protects web traffic containing credentials using SSL/TLS.
References
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| PR.PS-01.07 | Cryptographic keys and certificates | Mitigates | T1557.002 | ARP Cache Poisoning |
Comments
This diagnostic statement protects against Adversary-in-the-middle: ARP Cache Poisoning through the use of revocation of keys and key management. Employing key protection strategies for key material used in identity management and authentication processes over networks, limitations to specific accounts along with access control mechanisms provides protection against adversary-in-the-middle.
References
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| PR.IR-01.01 | Network segmentation | Mitigates | T1557.002 | ARP Cache Poisoning |
Comments
This diagnostic statement is for the implementation of network segmentation which helps prevent access to critical systems and sensitive information. Isolate infrastructure components and blocking network traffic that is not necessary can mitigate, or at least alleviate, the scope of AiTM activity.
References
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| PR.IR-04.01 | Utilization monitoring | Mitigates | T1557.002 | ARP Cache Poisoning |
Comments
This diagnostic statement describes how the organization establishes and manages baseline measures of network activity. Supported by network monitoring tools and other controls to detect events and identify incidents. Mitigating mechanisms may include: Data Loss Prevention (DLP); Filtering Network Traffic; Limit Network Traffic; Network Intrusion Prevention Systems (NIPS); and Network Segmentation for these type of network-based techniques.
References
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| PR.IR-01.02 | Network device configurations | Mitigates | T1557.002 | ARP Cache Poisoning |
Comments
This diagnostic statement provides protection through secure network device configurations (e.g., firewall rules, ports, and protocols) aligned to security baselines. Using network appliances to block or filter network traffic that is not necessary within the environment can prevent leveraging for AiTM conditions.
References
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| PR.IR-01.03 | Network communications integrity and availability | Mitigates | T1557.002 | ARP Cache Poisoning |
Comments
This diagnostic statement protects against ARP Cache Poisoning through the use of secure network configurations, architecture, implementations of zero trust architecture, and segmentation.
References
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| PR.IR-01.06 | Production environment segregation | Mitigates | T1557.002 | ARP Cache Poisoning |
Comments
This diagnostic statement provides protections for production environments. Measures such as network segmentation and access control reduce the attack surface, restrict movement by adversaries, and protect critical assets and data from compromise.
References
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| PR.PS-01.05 | Encryption standards | Mitigates | T1557.002 | ARP Cache Poisoning |
Comments
This diagnostic statement is associated with employing strong encryption methods to mitigate unauthorized access or theft of data that protect the confidentiality and integrity of data-at-rest, data-in-use, and data-in-transit. To address ARP Cache Poisoning, ensure that all wired and wireless traffic is encrypted appropriately, employs best practices for authentication protocols such as Kerberos, and protects web traffic containing credentials using SSL/TLS.
References
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| PR.PS-01.08 | End-user device protection | Mitigates | T1557.002 | ARP Cache Poisoning |
Comments
This diagnostic statement protects against ARP Cache Poisoning through the use of limiting access to resources to only authorized devices, management of personal computing devices, network intrusion prevention, and the use of antimalware.
References
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| Capability ID | Capability Description | Mapping Type | ATT&CK ID | ATT&CK Name | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| action.hacking.variety.Cache poisoning | Cache poisoning. Child of 'Exploit vuln'. | related-to | T1557.002 | ARP Cache Poisoning | |
| action.hacking.variety.AiTM | Adversary-in-the-middle attack. Child of 'Exploit vuln' | related-to | T1557.002 | ARP Cache Poisoning | |
| action.malware.variety.AiTM | Man-in-the-middle attack. Child of 'Exploit vuln'. | related-to | T1557.002 | ARP Cache Poisoning |
| Capability ID | Capability Description | Mapping Type | ATT&CK ID | ATT&CK Name | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| azure_private_link | Azure Private Link | technique_scores | T1557.002 | ARP Cache Poisoning |
Comments
This control reduces the likelihood of MiTM for traffic between remote users, cloud, and 3rd parties by routing the traffic via the Microsoft backbone rather than over the Internet.
References
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| azure_vpn_gateway | Azure VPN Gateway | technique_scores | T1557.002 | ARP Cache Poisoning |
Comments
This control can protect against adversary in the middle attacks.
References
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| Capability ID | Capability Description | Mapping Type | ATT&CK ID | ATT&CK Name | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| cloud_vpn | Cloud VPN | technique_scores | T1557.002 | ARP Cache Poisoning |
Comments
Cloud VPN enables traffic traveling between the two networks, and it is encrypted by one VPN gateway and then decrypted by the other VPN gateway. This action protects users' data as it travels over the internet. This control may prevent adversaries from attempting to position themselves between two or more networks and modify traffic.
References
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| Capability ID | Capability Description | Mapping Type | ATT&CK ID | ATT&CK Name | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| amazon_virtual_private_cloud | Amazon Virtual Private Cloud | technique_scores | T1557.002 | ARP Cache Poisoning |