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ATT&CK Techniques
T1554 Compromise Host Software Binary

T1554 Compromise Host Software Binary Mappings

Adversaries may modify host software binaries to establish persistent access to systems. Software binaries/executables provide a wide range of system commands or services, programs, and libraries. Common software binaries are SSH clients, FTP clients, email clients, web browsers, and many other user or server applications.

Adversaries may establish persistence though modifications to host software binaries. For example, an adversary may replace or otherwise infect a legitimate application binary (or support files) with a backdoor. Since these binaries may be routinely executed by applications or the user, the adversary can leverage this for persistent access to the host. An adversary may also modify a software binary such as an SSH client in order to persistently collect credentials during logins (i.e., Modify Authentication Process).(Citation: Google Cloud Mandiant UNC3886 2024)

An adversary may also modify an existing binary by patching in malicious functionality (e.g., IAT Hooking/Entry point patching)(Citation: Unit42 Banking Trojans Hooking 2022) prior to the binary’s legitimate execution. For example, an adversary may modify the entry point of a binary to point to malicious code patched in by the adversary before resuming normal execution flow.(Citation: ESET FontOnLake Analysis 2021)

After modifying a binary, an adversary may attempt to Impair Defenses by preventing it from updating (e.g., via the yum-versionlock command or versionlock.list file in Linux systems that use the yum package manager).(Citation: Google Cloud Mandiant UNC3886 2024)

View in MITRE ATT&CK®

NIST 800-53 Mappings

Capability ID	Capability Description	Mapping Type	ATT&CK ID	ATT&CK Name
CM-06	Configuration Settings	mitigates	T1554	Compromise Host Software Binary
CM-05	Access Restrictions for Change	mitigates	T1554	Compromise Host Software Binary
IA-09	Service Identification and Authentication	mitigates	T1554	Compromise Host Software Binary
SR-11	Component Authenticity	mitigates	T1554	Compromise Host Software Binary
SR-04	Provenance	mitigates	T1554	Compromise Host Software Binary
SR-05	Acquisition Strategies, Tools, and Methods	mitigates	T1554	Compromise Host Software Binary
SI-03	Malicious Code Protection	mitigates	T1554	Compromise Host Software Binary
SI-07	Software, Firmware, and Information Integrity	mitigates	T1554	Compromise Host Software Binary
CM-02	Baseline Configuration	mitigates	T1554	Compromise Host Software Binary
CM-02	Baseline Configuration	mitigates	T1554	Compromise Host Software Binary

VERIS Mappings

Capability ID	Capability Description	Mapping Type	ATT&CK ID	ATT&CK Name
action.hacking.variety.Backdoor	Hacking action that creates a backdoor for use.	related-to	T1554	Compromise Host Software Binary
action.hacking.vector.Backdoor	Hacking actions taken through a backdoor. C2 is only used by malware.	related-to	T1554	Compromise Host Software Binary
action.malware.variety.Adminware	System or network utilities (e.g., PsTools, Netcat)	related-to	T1554	Compromise Host Software Binary
action.malware.variety.Backdoor	Malware creates a backdoor capability for hacking. Child of 'RAT' when combined with 'Trojan'. Child of 'Backdoor or C2'.	related-to	T1554	Compromise Host Software Binary
action.malware.variety.Backdoor or C2	Malware creates a remote control capability, but it's unclear if it's a backdoor for hacking or C2 for malware. Parent of 'C2' and 'Backdoor'.	related-to	T1554	Compromise Host Software Binary
action.malware.variety.Trojan	An application which appears legitimate but hides malicious functionality. Child of 'RAT' when combined with 'Backdoor'	related-to	T1554	Compromise Host Software Binary

GCP Mappings

Capability ID	Capability Description	Mapping Type	ATT&CK ID	ATT&CK Name	Notes
binary_authorization	Binary Authorization	technique_scores	T1554	Compromise Host Software Binary	Comments Each image has a signer digitally sign using a private key. At deploy time, the enforcer uses the attester's public key to verify the signature in the attestation. References ['https://cloud.google.com/binary-authorization/docs/overview' 'https://cloud.google.com/binary-authorization/docs/attestations']