T1221 Template Injection

Adversaries may create or modify references in user document templates to conceal malicious code or force authentication attempts. For example, Microsoft’s Office Open XML (OOXML) specification defines an XML-based format for Office documents (.docx, xlsx, .pptx) to replace older binary formats (.doc, .xls, .ppt). OOXML files are packed together ZIP archives compromised of various XML files, referred to as parts, containing properties that collectively define how a document is rendered.(Citation: Microsoft Open XML July 2017)

Properties within parts may reference shared public resources accessed via online URLs. For example, template properties may reference a file, serving as a pre-formatted document blueprint, that is fetched when the document is loaded.

Adversaries may abuse these templates to initially conceal malicious code to be executed via user documents. Template references injected into a document may enable malicious payloads to be fetched and executed when the document is loaded.(Citation: SANS Brian Wiltse Template Injection) These documents can be delivered via other techniques such as Phishing and/or Taint Shared Content and may evade static detections since no typical indicators (VBA macro, script, etc.) are present until after the malicious payload is fetched.(Citation: Redxorblue Remote Template Injection) Examples have been seen in the wild where template injection was used to load malicious code containing an exploit.(Citation: MalwareBytes Template Injection OCT 2017)

Adversaries may also modify the <code>*\template</code> control word within an .rtf file to similarly conceal then download malicious code. This legitimate control word value is intended to be a file destination of a template file resource that is retrieved and loaded when an .rtf file is opened. However, adversaries may alter the bytes of an existing .rtf file to insert a template control word field to include a URL resource of a malicious payload.(Citation: Proofpoint RTF Injection)(Citation: Ciberseguridad Decoding malicious RTF files)

This technique may also enable Forced Authentication by injecting a SMB/HTTPS (or other credential prompting) URL and triggering an authentication attempt.(Citation: Anomali Template Injection MAR 2018)(Citation: Talos Template Injection July 2017)(Citation: ryhanson phishery SEPT 2016)

View in MITRE ATT&CK®

CRI Profile Mappings

Capability ID Capability Description Mapping Type ATT&CK ID ATT&CK Name Notes
DE.AE-02.01 Event analysis and detection Mitigates T1221 Template Injection
Comments
This diagnostic statement provides for implementation of methods to block similar future attacks via security tools such as antivirus and IDS/IPS to provide protection against threats and exploitation attempts.
References
    PR.IR-01.08 End-user device access Mitigates T1221 Template Injection
    Comments
    This diagnostic statement implements technical controls (e.g., VPN, antivirus software) to address the risks of end-user personal computing devices accessing the organization’s network and resources.
    References
      PR.PS-05.01 Malware prevention Mitigates T1221 Template Injection
      Comments
      Antivirus/Antimalware software can be utilized to prevent documents from fetching and/or executing malicious payloads.
      References
        PR.PS-01.01 Configuration baselines Mitigates T1221 Template Injection
        Comments
        This diagnostic statement provides for securely configuring production systems. This includes hardening default configurations and making security-focused setting adjustments to reduce the attack surface, enforce best practices, and protect sensitive data thereby mitigating adversary exploitation.
        References
          DE.CM-01.01 Intrusion detection and prevention Mitigates T1221 Template Injection
          Comments
          Network/Host intrusion prevention systems, antivirus, and detonation chambers can be employed to prevent documents from fetching and/or executing malicious payloads that adversaries can steal in document templates.
          References
            PR.IR-01.03 Network communications integrity and availability Mitigates T1221 Template Injection
            Comments
            This diagnostic statement protects against Template Injection through the use of secure network configurations, architecture, implementations of zero trust architecture, and segmentation.
            References
              PR.PS-01.08 End-user device protection Mitigates T1221 Template Injection
              Comments
              This diagnostic statement protects against Template Injection through the use of limiting access to resources to only authorized devices, management of personal computing devices, network intrusion prevention, and the use of antimalware.
              References

                VERIS Mappings

                Capability ID Capability Description Mapping Type ATT&CK ID ATT&CK Name Notes
                action.malware.variety.Client-side attack Client-side or browser attack (e.g., redirection, XSS, AitB) related-to T1221 Template Injection

                GCP Mappings

                Capability ID Capability Description Mapping Type ATT&CK ID ATT&CK Name Notes
                cloud_ids Cloud IDS technique_scores T1221 Template Injection
                Comments
                Often used by adversaries to establish persistence, Palo Alto Network's antivirus signatures is able to detect malware found in executables and Microsoft Office file templates (e.g., DOC, DOCX, RTF, XLS, XLSX, PPT, PPTX). Although there are ways an attacker could modify the known attack signature to avoid detection, this technique was scored as significant based on Palo Alto Network's advanced threat detection technology which constantly updates to detect against the latest known variations of these attacks.
                References