T1195 Supply Chain Compromise Mappings

Adversaries may manipulate products or product delivery mechanisms prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise.

Supply chain compromise can take place at any stage of the supply chain including:

  • Manipulation of development tools
  • Manipulation of a development environment
  • Manipulation of source code repositories (public or private)
  • Manipulation of source code in open-source dependencies
  • Manipulation of software update/distribution mechanisms
  • Compromised/infected system images (multiple cases of removable media infected at the factory)(Citation: IBM Storwize)(Citation: Schneider Electric USB Malware)
  • Replacement of legitimate software with modified versions
  • Sales of modified/counterfeit products to legitimate distributors
  • Shipment interdiction

While supply chain compromise can impact any component of hardware or software, adversaries looking to gain execution have often focused on malicious additions to legitimate software in software distribution or update channels.(Citation: Avast CCleaner3 2018)(Citation: Microsoft Dofoil 2018)(Citation: Command Five SK 2011) Targeting may be specific to a desired victim set or malicious software may be distributed to a broad set of consumers but only move on to additional tactics on specific victims.(Citation: Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012)(Citation: Avast CCleaner3 2018)(Citation: Command Five SK 2011) Popular open source projects that are used as dependencies in many applications may also be targeted as a means to add malicious code to users of the dependency.(Citation: Trendmicro NPM Compromise)

View in MITRE ATT&CK®

NIST 800-53 Mappings

Capability ID Capability Description Mapping Type ATT&CK ID ATT&CK Name Notes
CA-07 Continuous Monitoring mitigates T1195 Supply Chain Compromise
CM-06 Configuration Settings mitigates T1195 Supply Chain Compromise
CM-05 Access Restrictions for Change mitigates T1195 Supply Chain Compromise
CM-08 System Component Inventory mitigates T1195 Supply Chain Compromise
CA-02 Control Assessments mitigates T1195 Supply Chain Compromise
RA-10 Threat Hunting mitigates T1195 Supply Chain Compromise
SA-22 Unsupported System Components mitigates T1195 Supply Chain Compromise
CM-11 User-installed Software mitigates T1195 Supply Chain Compromise
SR-11 Component Authenticity mitigates T1195 Supply Chain Compromise
SR-04 Provenance mitigates T1195 Supply Chain Compromise
SR-05 Acquisition Strategies, Tools, and Methods mitigates T1195 Supply Chain Compromise
SI-02 Flaw Remediation mitigates T1195 Supply Chain Compromise
RA-05 Vulnerability Monitoring and Scanning mitigates T1195 Supply Chain Compromise
SI-03 Malicious Code Protection mitigates T1195 Supply Chain Compromise
SI-07 Software, Firmware, and Information Integrity mitigates T1195 Supply Chain Compromise
CM-02 Baseline Configuration mitigates T1195 Supply Chain Compromise
CM-07 Least Functionality mitigates T1195 Supply Chain Compromise
SI-04 System Monitoring mitigates T1195 Supply Chain Compromise
AC-02 Account Management mitigates T1195 Supply Chain Compromise
AC-03 Access Enforcement mitigates T1195 Supply Chain Compromise
AC-06 Least Privilege mitigates T1195 Supply Chain Compromise
CM-03 Configuration Change Control mitigates T1195 Supply Chain Compromise

VERIS Mappings

Capability ID Capability Description Mapping Type ATT&CK ID ATT&CK Name Notes
action.hacking.vector.Partner Partner connection or credential. (Indicates supply chain breach.) related-to T1195 Supply Chain Compromise
action.malware.vector.Partner Partner connection or credential. (Indicates supply chain breach.) related-to T1195 Supply Chain Compromise
action.malware.vector.Software update Included in automated software update related-to T1195 Supply Chain Compromise

GCP Mappings

Capability ID Capability Description Mapping Type ATT&CK ID ATT&CK Name Notes
assured_oss Assured Open Source Software technique_scores T1195 Supply Chain Compromise
Comments
Assured OSS provides Google OSS packages built with security features to help improve the security of a software supply chain, including vulnerability testing, signed provenance, and secured distribution.
References
mandiant_digital_threatmon Mandiant Digital Threat Monitoring technique_scores T1195 Supply Chain Compromise
Comments
Mandiant Digital Threat Monitoring continually monitors for compromised credentials and data leaks on both the open and dark web. This control may protect against credential abuse by alerting on leaked credentials. Since this control must depend on accessible sources for dumps, it does not protect against credentials that have been collected for a campaign but never posted, so the score is partial.
References
google_secops Google Security Operations technique_scores T1195 Supply Chain Compromise
Comments
Google Security Ops is able to trigger alerts based on unusual file write events by 3rd party software, specifically SolarWinds executable. This technique was scored as minimal based on low or uncertain detection coverage factor. https://github.com/chronicle/detection-rules/blob/783e0e5947774785db1c55041b70176deeca6f46/soc_prime_rules/threat_hunting/file_event/unusual_solarwinds_file_creation__via_filewrite.yaral https://github.com/chronicle/detection-rules/blob/783e0e5947774785db1c55041b70176deeca6f46/suspicious/unusual_location_svchost_write.yaral
References

ATT&CK Subtechniques

Technique ID Technique Name Number of Mappings
T1195.001 Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools 19
T1195.003 Compromise Hardware Supply Chain 14
T1195.002 Compromise Software Supply Chain 15