Adversaries may modify access tokens to operate under a different user or system security context to perform actions and bypass access controls. Windows uses access tokens to determine the ownership of a running process. A user can manipulate access tokens to make a running process appear as though it is the child of a different process or belongs to someone other than the user that started the process. When this occurs, the process also takes on the security context associated with the new token.
An adversary can use built-in Windows API functions to copy access tokens from existing processes; this is known as token stealing. These token can then be applied to an existing process (i.e. Token Impersonation/Theft) or used to spawn a new process (i.e. Create Process with Token). An adversary must already be in a privileged user context (i.e. administrator) to steal a token. However, adversaries commonly use token stealing to elevate their security context from the administrator level to the SYSTEM level. An adversary can then use a token to authenticate to a remote system as the account for that token if the account has appropriate permissions on the remote system.(Citation: Pentestlab Token Manipulation)
Any standard user can use the <code>runas</code> command, and the Windows API functions, to create impersonation tokens; it does not require access to an administrator account. There are also other mechanisms, such as Active Directory fields, that can be used to modify access tokens.
View in MITRE ATT&CK®Capability ID | Capability Description | Mapping Type | ATT&CK ID | ATT&CK Name | Notes |
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PR.AA-05.02 | Privileged system access | Mitigates | T1134 | Access Token Manipulation |
Comments
This diagnostic statement protects against Access Token Manipulation through the use of privileged account management and the use of multi-factor authentication.
References
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DE.CM-06.02 | Third-party access monitoring | Mitigates | T1134 | Access Token Manipulation |
Comments
This diagnostic statement protects against Access Token Manipulation through the use of privileged account management. Employing auditing, privilege access management, and just in time access protects against adversaries trying to obtain illicit access to critical systems.
References
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PR.AA-05.01 | Access privilege limitation | Mitigates | T1134 | Access Token Manipulation |
Comments
This diagnostic statement describes the implementation of least privilege principle, which can be applied to limiting permissions through role-based access controls, file and directory permissions, and the execution of systems and services. An adversary must already have high-level, admin or root level access on a local system to make full use of these ATT&CK techniques. Restrict users and accounts to the least privileges they require can help mitigate these techniques.
References
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PR.AA-01.02 | Physical and logical access | Mitigates | T1134 | Access Token Manipulation |
Comments
This diagnostic statement describes how the organization ensures users are identified and authenticated before accessing systems, applications, and hardware, with logical access controls permitting access only to authorized individuals with legitimate business needs. Logical access controls in relation to systems can refer to the use of MFA, user account management, and other role-based access control mechanisms to enforce policies for authentication and authorization of user accounts.
References
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PR.IR-01.06 | Production environment segregation | Mitigates | T1134 | Access Token Manipulation |
Comments
This diagnostic statement provides protections for production environments. Measures such as network segmentation and access control reduce the attack surface, restrict movement by adversaries, and protect critical assets and data from compromise.
References
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PR.AA-01.01 | Identity and credential management | Mitigates | T1134 | Access Token Manipulation |
Comments
This diagnostic statement protects against Access Token Manipulation through the use of hardened access control policies, secure defaults, password complexity requirements, multifactor authentication requirements, and removal of terminated accounts.
References
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Capability ID | Capability Description | Mapping Type | ATT&CK ID | ATT&CK Name | Notes |
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IA-13 | Identity Providers and Authorization Servers | mitigates | T1134 | Access Token Manipulation | |
CM-06 | Configuration Settings | mitigates | T1134 | Access Token Manipulation | |
CM-05 | Access Restrictions for Change | mitigates | T1134 | Access Token Manipulation | |
IA-02 | Identification and Authentication (Organizational Users) | mitigates | T1134 | Access Token Manipulation | |
AC-02 | Account Management | mitigates | T1134 | Access Token Manipulation | |
AC-03 | Access Enforcement | mitigates | T1134 | Access Token Manipulation | |
AC-05 | Separation of Duties | mitigates | T1134 | Access Token Manipulation | |
AC-06 | Least Privilege | mitigates | T1134 | Access Token Manipulation |
Capability ID | Capability Description | Mapping Type | ATT&CK ID | ATT&CK Name | Notes |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
action.hacking.variety.Unknown | Unknown | related-to | T1134 | Access Token Manipulation | |
action.hacking.variety.Use of stolen creds | Use of stolen or default authentication credentials (including credential stuffing) | related-to | T1134 | Access Token Manipulation |
Capability ID | Capability Description | Mapping Type | ATT&CK ID | ATT&CK Name | Notes |
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alerts_for_windows_machines | Alerts for Windows Machines | technique_scores | T1134 | Access Token Manipulation |
Comments
This control can detect when commands associated with this technique are executed, such as runas.
References
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defender_for_app_service | Microsoft Defender for Cloud: Defender for App Service | technique_scores | T1134 | Access Token Manipulation |
Comments
This control analyzes host data to detect execution of known malicious PowerShell PowerSploit cmdlets. This covers execution of this technique via the Invoke-TokenManipulation module on Windows, but does not address other procedures or platforms, and temporal factor is unknown, resulting in a Minimal score.
References
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Capability ID | Capability Description | Mapping Type | ATT&CK ID | ATT&CK Name | Notes |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
google_secops | Google Security Operations | technique_scores | T1134 | Access Token Manipulation |
Comments
Google Security Ops is able to trigger an alert based on modifications to user access controls.
This technique was scored as minimal based on low or uncertain detection coverage factor.
https://github.com/chronicle/detection-rules/blob/783e0e5947774785db1c55041b70176deeca6f46/soc_prime_rules/cloud_security/sysmon/suspicious_command_line_contains_azure_tokencache_dat_as_argument__via_cmdline.yaral
References
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Technique ID | Technique Name | Number of Mappings |
---|---|---|
T1134.002 | Create Process with Token | 13 |
T1134.001 | Token Impersonation/Theft | 14 |
T1134.003 | Make and Impersonate Token | 15 |
T1134.005 | SID-History Injection | 15 |