Adversaries may transfer tools or other files from an external system into a compromised environment. Tools or files may be copied from an external adversary-controlled system to the victim network through the command and control channel or through alternate protocols such as ftp. Once present, adversaries may also transfer/spread tools between victim devices within a compromised environment (i.e. Lateral Tool Transfer).
On Windows, adversaries may use various utilities to download tools, such as copy, finger, certutil, and PowerShell commands such as <code>IEX(New-Object Net.WebClient).downloadString()</code> and <code>Invoke-WebRequest</code>. On Linux and macOS systems, a variety of utilities also exist, such as curl, scp, sftp, tftp, rsync, finger, and wget.(Citation: t1105_lolbas)
Adversaries may also abuse installers and package managers, such as yum or winget, to download tools to victim hosts. Adversaries have also abused file application features, such as the Windows search-ms protocol handler, to deliver malicious files to victims through remote file searches invoked by User Execution (typically after interacting with Phishing lures).(Citation: T1105: Trellix_search-ms)
Files can also be transferred using various Web Services as well as native or otherwise present tools on the victim system.(Citation: PTSecurity Cobalt Dec 2016) In some cases, adversaries may be able to leverage services that sync between a web-based and an on-premises client, such as Dropbox or OneDrive, to transfer files onto victim systems. For example, by compromising a cloud account and logging into the service's web portal, an adversary may be able to trigger an automatic syncing process that transfers the file onto the victim's machine.(Citation: Dropbox Malware Sync)
View in MITRE ATT&CK®| Capability ID | Capability Description | Mapping Type | ATT&CK ID | ATT&CK Name | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CA-07 | Continuous Monitoring | mitigates | T1105 | Ingress Tool Transfer | |
| CM-06 | Configuration Settings | mitigates | T1105 | Ingress Tool Transfer | |
| SI-03 | Malicious Code Protection | mitigates | T1105 | Ingress Tool Transfer | |
| CM-02 | Baseline Configuration | mitigates | T1105 | Ingress Tool Transfer | |
| CM-07 | Least Functionality | mitigates | T1105 | Ingress Tool Transfer | |
| SI-04 | System Monitoring | mitigates | T1105 | Ingress Tool Transfer | |
| AC-04 | Information Flow Enforcement | mitigates | T1105 | Ingress Tool Transfer | |
| SC-07 | Boundary Protection | mitigates | T1105 | Ingress Tool Transfer |
| Capability ID | Capability Description | Mapping Type | ATT&CK ID | ATT&CK Name | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| action.hacking.variety.Other | Other | related-to | T1105 | Ingress Tool Transfer | |
| action.hacking.variety.Abuse of functionality | Abuse of functionality. | related-to | T1105 | Ingress Tool Transfer | |
| action.hacking.vector.Other network service | Network service that is not remote access or a web application. | related-to | T1105 | Ingress Tool Transfer |
| Capability ID | Capability Description | Mapping Type | ATT&CK ID | ATT&CK Name | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| google_secops | Google Security Operations | technique_scores | T1105 | Ingress Tool Transfer |
Comments
Google Security Ops is able to trigger an alert based off suspicious system processes that could indicate tool transfer attempts using cURL from Windows machines (e.g., C:\\Windows\\System32\\curl.exe).
This technique was scored as minimal based on low or uncertain detection coverage factor.
https://github.com/chronicle/detection-rules/blob/783e0e5947774785db1c55041b70176deeca6f46/soc_prime_rules/threat_hunting/windows/suspicious_curl_usage.yaral
References
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| security_command_center | Security Command Center | technique_scores | T1105 | Ingress Tool Transfer |
Comments
SCC uses machine learning [NLP techniques] to evaluate content of an executed bash script. This security solution protects against potentially malicious scripts that are used to transfer tools into a compromised environment and execute commands without binaries. Because of the high threat detection coverage provided by the ML model and near-real time temporal factor this control was graded as significant.
References
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