Adversaries may manipulate accounts to maintain and/or elevate access to victim systems. Account manipulation may consist of any action that preserves or modifies adversary access to a compromised account, such as modifying credentials or permission groups.(Citation: FireEye SMOKEDHAM June 2021) These actions could also include account activity designed to subvert security policies, such as performing iterative password updates to bypass password duration policies and preserve the life of compromised credentials.
In order to create or manipulate accounts, the adversary must already have sufficient permissions on systems or the domain. However, account manipulation may also lead to privilege escalation where modifications grant access to additional roles, permissions, or higher-privileged Valid Accounts.
View in MITRE ATT&CK®Capability ID | Capability Description | Mapping Type | ATT&CK ID | ATT&CK Name | Notes |
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PR.IR-01.05 | Remote access protection | Mitigates | T1098 | Account Manipulation |
Comments
This diagnostic statement implements security controls and restrictions for remote user access to systems. Remote user access control involves managing and securing how users remotely access systems, such as through encrypted connections and account use policies, which help prevent adversary access.
References
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PR.IR-01.04 | Wireless network protection | Mitigates | T1098 | Account Manipulation |
Comments
This diagnostic statement provides protections for wireless networks. Implementation of wireless network management measures such as network segmentation and access controls reduces the attack surface, restricts movement by adversaries, and protects data from compromise.
References
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PR.PS-01.01 | Configuration baselines | Mitigates | T1098 | Account Manipulation |
Comments
This diagnostic statement provides for securely configuring production systems. This includes hardening default configurations and making security-focused setting adjustments to reduce the attack surface, enforce best practices, and protect sensitive data thereby mitigating adversary exploitation.
References
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PR.PS-01.02 | Least functionality | Mitigates | T1098 | Account Manipulation |
Comments
This diagnostic statement provides for limiting unnecessary software, services, ports, protocols, etc. Ensuring systems only have installed and enabled what is essential for their operation reduces the attack surface and minimizes vulnerabilities, which mitigates a wide range of techniques.
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PR.AA-05.02 | Privileged system access | Mitigates | T1098 | Account Manipulation |
Comments
This diagnostic statement protects against Account Manipulation through the use of privileged account management and the use of multi-factor authentication.
References
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DE.CM-06.02 | Third-party access monitoring | Mitigates | T1098 | Account Manipulation |
Comments
This diagnostic statement protects against Account Manipulation through the use of privileged account management. Employing auditing, privilege access management, and just in time access protects against adversaries trying to obtain illicit access to critical systems.
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PR.AA-02.01 | Authentication of identity | Mitigates | T1098 | Account Manipulation |
Comments
This diagnostic statement provides protection from Account Manipulation through the implementation of privileged account management controls to limit credential access. Employing limitations to specific accounts, access control mechanisms, and auditing the attribution logs provides protection against adversaries attempting to modify accounts.
References
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PR.AA-04.01 | Access control within and across security perimeters | Mitigates | T1098 | Account Manipulation |
Comments
This diagnostic statement provides protection from Account Manipulation through the implementation of privileged account management controls to limit credential access. Employing limitations to specific accounts, access control mechanisms, and auditing the attribution logs provides protection against adversaries attempting to modify accounts.
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PR.AA-05.01 | Access privilege limitation | Mitigates | T1098 | Account Manipulation |
Comments
This diagnostic statement describes the implementation of least privilege principle, which can be applied to limiting permissions through role-based access controls, file and directory permissions, and the execution of systems and services. An adversary must already have high-level, admin or root level access on a local system to make full use of these ATT&CK techniques. Restrict users and accounts to the least privileges they require can help mitigate these techniques
References
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PR.PS-01.03 | Configuration deviation | Mitigates | T1098 | Account Manipulation |
Comments
This diagnostic statement provides protection from Account Manipulation through the implementation of security configuration baselines for OS, software, file integrity monitoring and imaging. Security baseline configuration of the Operating System and integrity checking can help protect against adversaries attempting to compromise and modify software and its configurations.
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PR.PS-01.07 | Cryptographic keys and certificates | Mitigates | T1098 | Account Manipulation |
Comments
This diagnostic statement protects against Account Manipulation through the use of revocation of keys and key management. Employing limitations to specific accounts along with access control mechanisms provides protection against adversaries attempting to manipulate accounts.
References
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PR.PS-01.09 | Virtualized end point protection | Mitigates | T1098 | Account Manipulation |
Comments
The diagnostic statement highlights several mechanisms that organizations can implement to protect endpoint systems using virtualization technologies, essentially hypervisor hardening. Use multi-factor authentication for user and privileged accounts running virtual machines.
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PR.AA-05.03 | Service accounts | Mitigates | T1098 | Account Manipulation |
Comments
This diagnostic statement describes how the organization establishes security standards based on industry guidelines to institute strict controls over service account (i.e., accounts used by systems to access other systems).
References
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DE.CM-03.03 | Privileged account monitoring | Mitigates | T1098 | Account Manipulation |
Comments
This diagnostic statement implements mechanisms and tools to mitigate potential misuse of privileged users and accounts. Continuous monitoring of role and attribute assignments and activity is essential to prevent and detect unauthorized access or misuse.
References
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PR.AA-01.02 | Physical and logical access | Mitigates | T1098 | Account Manipulation |
Comments
This diagnostic statement describes how the organization ensures users are identified and authenticated before accessing systems, applications, and hardware, with logical access controls permitting access only to authorized individuals with legitimate business needs. Logical access controls in relation to systems can refer to the use of MFA, user account management, and other role-based access control mechanisms to enforce policies for authentication and authorization of user accounts.
References
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PR.AA-03.01 | Authentication requirements | Mitigates | T1098 | Account Manipulation |
Comments
This diagnostic statement describes how the organization implement appropriate authentication requirements, including selecting mechanisms based on risk, utilizing multi-factor authentication where necessary, and safeguarding the storage of authenticators like pins and passwords to protect sensitive access credentials.
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PR.IR-01.01 | Network segmentation | Mitigates | T1098 | Account Manipulation |
Comments
This diagnostic statement is for the implementation of network segmentation which helps prevent access to critical systems and sensitive information. Employing proper network segmentation limits access to critical systems and domain controllers.
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PR.IR-01.06 | Production environment segregation | Mitigates | T1098 | Account Manipulation |
Comments
This diagnostic statement provides protections for production environments. Measures such as network segmentation and access control reduce the attack surface, restrict movement by adversaries, and protect critical assets and data from compromise.
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PR.AA-01.01 | Identity and credential management | Mitigates | T1098 | Account Manipulation |
Comments
This diagnostic statement protects against Account Manipulation through the use of hardened access control policies, secure defaults, password complexity requirements, multifactor authentication requirements, and removal of terminated accounts.
References
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Capability ID | Capability Description | Mapping Type | ATT&CK ID | ATT&CK Name | Notes |
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CM-06 | Configuration Settings | mitigates | T1098 | Account Manipulation | |
CM-05 | Access Restrictions for Change | mitigates | T1098 | Account Manipulation | |
IA-02 | Identification and Authentication (Organizational Users) | mitigates | T1098 | Account Manipulation | |
CM-07 | Least Functionality | mitigates | T1098 | Account Manipulation | |
SI-04 | System Monitoring | mitigates | T1098 | Account Manipulation | |
AC-02 | Account Management | mitigates | T1098 | Account Manipulation | |
AC-03 | Access Enforcement | mitigates | T1098 | Account Manipulation | |
AC-04 | Information Flow Enforcement | mitigates | T1098 | Account Manipulation | |
AC-05 | Separation of Duties | mitigates | T1098 | Account Manipulation | |
AC-06 | Least Privilege | mitigates | T1098 | Account Manipulation | |
SC-07 | Boundary Protection | mitigates | T1098 | Account Manipulation |
Capability ID | Capability Description | Mapping Type | ATT&CK ID | ATT&CK Name | Notes |
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microsoft_sentinel | Microsoft Sentinel | technique_scores | T1098 | Account Manipulation |
Comments
The following Microsoft Sentinel Hunting queries can identify potentially malicious manipulation of accounts to increase or maintain access: "Azure DevOps - Guest users access enabled", "Azure DevOps - Additional Org Admin added", "Anomalous Activity Role Assignment", "Anomalous Role Assignment", and "Anomalous AAD Account Manipulation", which indicate expansion of accounts' access/privileges; "Bots added to multiple teams" which indicates workspace access granted to automated accounts.
The following Microsoft Sentinel Analytics queries can identify potentially malicious manipulation of accounts to increase or maintain access: "Suspicious granting of permissions to an account" from a previously unobserved IP address, "External user added and removed in short timeframe" for Teams resources, "Account added and removed from privileged group", "User account added to built in domain local or global group", and "New user created and added to the built-in administrator group". "Multiple Password Reset by user" can detect potentially malicious iterative password resets.
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file_integrity_monitoring | Microsoft Defender for Cloud: File Integrity Monitoring | technique_scores | T1098 | Account Manipulation |
Comments
This control can detect account manipulation.
References
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devops_security | Microsoft Defender for Cloud: DevOps Security | technique_scores | T1098 | Account Manipulation |
Comments
This capability can protect against Account Manipulation by requiring DevOps best practices.
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ai_security_recommendations | Microsoft Defender for Cloud: AI Security Recommendations | technique_scores | T1098 | Account Manipulation |
Comments
This control's "Immutable (read-only) root filesystem should be enforced for containers" recommendation can prevent modifying the ssh_authorized keys file. Because it is a recommendation and limited to only one sub-technique, its score is Minimal.
References
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alerts_for_linux_machines | Alerts for Linux Machines | technique_scores | T1098 | Account Manipulation |
Comments
This control provides partial detection for only one of this technique's sub-techniques and does not cover most of its procedure examples, resulting in a score of Minimal.
References
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azure_policy | Azure Policy | technique_scores | T1098 | Account Manipulation |
Comments
This control can protect against account manipulation.
References
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azure_role_based_access_control | Azure Role-Based Access Control | technique_scores | T1098 | Account Manipulation |
Comments
This control provides protection for some of this technique's sub-techniques and therefore its coverage score factor is Partial, resulting in a Partial score.
References
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Capability ID | Capability Description | Mapping Type | ATT&CK ID | ATT&CK Name | Notes |
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advanced_protection_program | Advanced Protection Program | technique_scores | T1098 | Account Manipulation |
Comments
Advanced Protection Program enables the use of a security key for multi-factor authentication. This provides significant protection against unauthorized users from accessing and manipulating accounts to retain access.
References
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cloud_asset_inventory | Cloud Asset Inventory | technique_scores | T1098 | Account Manipulation |
Comments
This control may be able to detect when adversaries use cloud accounts to elevate privileges through manipulation of IAM or access policies. This monitoring can be fine tuned to specific assets, policies, and organizations.
References
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google_secops | Google Security Operations | technique_scores | T1098 | Account Manipulation |
Comments
Google Security Ops is able to trigger an alert to ensure multi-factor authentication is enabled for all non-service and administrator accounts.
This technique was scored as minimal based on low or uncertain detection coverage factor.
https://github.com/chronicle/detection-rules/blob/main/gcp_cloudaudit/gcp_multifactor_authentication.yaral
References
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identity_and_access_management | Identity and Access Management | technique_scores | T1098 | Account Manipulation |
Comments
Privileged roles and permissions can be granted to entire groups of users by default, and admins can control unwanted access by utilizing machine learning to recommend smart access control permissions within an organization. This control can help mitigate adversaries from gaining access to unwanted account.
References
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identity_platform | Identity Platform | technique_scores | T1098 | Account Manipulation |
Comments
Identity Platform can help protect your app's users and prevent account takeovers by offering multi-factor authentication (MFA) and integrating with Google's intelligence for account protection. This will help mitigate adversaries from gaining access to permission levels.
References
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policy_intelligence | Policy Intelligence | technique_scores | T1098 | Account Manipulation |
Comments
Utilization and enforcement of MFA for user accounts to ensure that IAM policies are implemented properly shall mitigate adversaries so that they may not gain access to user accounts. Enforce the principle of least privilege by ensuring that principals have only the permissions that they actually need.
References
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resource_manager | Resource Manager | technique_scores | T1098 | Account Manipulation |
Comments
GCP offers Identity and Access Management (IAM), which lets admins give more granular access to specific Google Cloud resources and prevents unwanted access to other resources. This allows configuration of access controls and firewalls to limit access to critical systems and domain controllers.
References
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vpc_service_controls | VPC Service Controls | technique_scores | T1098 | Account Manipulation |
Comments
VPC further segments the environment by providing configurable granular access controls which help limit user communications to critical systems.
References
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Capability ID | Capability Description | Mapping Type | ATT&CK ID | ATT&CK Name | Notes |
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amazon_guardduty | Amazon GuardDuty | technique_scores | T1098 | Account Manipulation |
Comments
GuardDuty has a finding types that flag events where an adversary may have compromised an AWS IAM User. Finding Type: Persistence:IAMUser/AnomalousBehavior
References
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aws_config | AWS Config | technique_scores | T1098 | Account Manipulation |
Comments
This control provides significant coverage for one of this technique's sub-techniques, resulting in an overall score of Minimal.
References
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aws_identity_and_access_management | AWS Identity and Access Management | technique_scores | T1098 | Account Manipulation |
Comments
This control may generate logs for creation and manipulation of accounts but the relevant security information would be handled by another security control.
References
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aws_security_hub | AWS Security Hub | technique_scores | T1098 | Account Manipulation |
Comments
AWS Security Hub performs a check from the AWS Foundations CIS Benchmark that, if implemented, would help towards detecting the manipulation of accounts. AWS Security Hub provides this detection with the following check.
3.4 Ensure a log metric filter and alarm exist for IAM policy changes
This is scored as Minimal because it only supports a subset of the sub-techniques.
References
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Capability ID | Capability Description | Mapping Type | ATT&CK ID | ATT&CK Name | Notes |
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DEF-ID-E5 | Microsoft Defender for Identity | Technique Scores | T1098 | Account Manipulation |
Comments
This controls's "Suspicious additions to sensitive groups (external ID 2024)" alert can utilize machine learning to detect when an attacker adds users to highly privileged groups. Adding users is done to gain access to more resources, and gain persistency. This detection relies on profiling the group modification activities of users, and alerting when an abnormal addition to a sensitive group is observed. Defender for Identity profiles continuously.
This alert provides Partial coverage of this technique with a reduced false-positive rate by utilizing machine learning models.
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DEF-SECA-E3 | Security Alerts | Technique Scores | T1098 | Account Manipulation |
Comments
Microsoft Defender security alerts explain the suspicious activities detected by Defender for Identity sensors on your network, and the actors and computers involved in each threat. Alert evidence lists contain direct links to the involved users and computers, to help make your investigations easy and direct.
Defender security alerts are divided into the following categories or phases, like the phases seen in a typical cyber-attack kill chain. Learn more about each phase, the alerts designed to detect each attack, and how to use the alerts to help protect your network using the following links:
Reconnaissance and discovery alerts
Persistence and privilege escalation alerts
Credential access alerts
Lateral movement alerts
Other alerts
License: A Microsoft 365 security product license entitles customer use
of Microsoft Defender XDR.
References
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DEF-CAPP-E5 | Defender for Cloud Apps | Technique Scores | T1098 | Account Manipulation |
Comments
This control can detect anomalous admin activity that may be indicative of account manipulation. Relevant alerts include "Unusual administrative activity (by user)" and "Unusual addition of credentials to an OAuth app".
References
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EID-IDPR-E5 | ID Protection | Technique Scores | T1098 | Account Manipulation |
Comments
Microsoft Entra ID Protection helps organizations detect, investigate, and remediate identity-based risks. These identity-based risks can be further fed into tools like Conditional Access to make access decisions or fed back to a security information and event management (SIEM) tool for further investigation and correlation. Identity Protection requires users be a Security Reader, Security Operator, Security Administrator, Global Reader, or Global Administrator in order to access the dashboard.
License Requirements:
Microsoft Entra ID P2
References
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DEF-IR-E5 | Incident Response | Technique Scores | T1098 | Account Manipulation |
Comments
An incident in Microsoft Defender XDR is a collection of correlated alerts and associated data that make up the story of an attack. Microsoft 365 services and apps create alerts when they detect a suspicious or malicious event or activity. Individual alerts provide valuable clues about a completed or ongoing attack. Attacks typically employ various techniques against different types of entities, such as devices, users, and mailboxes. The result of this is multiple alerts for multiple entities in your tenant. Piecing the individual alerts together to gain insight into an attack can be challenging and time-consuming, Microsoft Defender XDR automatically aggregates the alerts and their associated information into an incident. A typical Incident Response workflow in Microsoft Defender XDR begins with a triage action, next is the investigate action, and finally is the response action.
Microsoft 365 Defender Incident Response responds to Account Manipulation attacks due to Incident Response monitoring for persistence and privilege escalation alerts which monitors for newly constructed processes indicative of modifying account settings.
License Requirements:
Microsoft Defender XDR
References
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PUR-PAM-E5 | Privileged Access Management | Technique Scores | T1098 | Account Manipulation |
Comments
Microsoft Purview Privileged Access Management allows granular access control over privileged admin tasks in Office 365. It can help protect your organization from breaches that use existing privileged admin accounts with standing access to sensitive data or access to critical configuration settings. Privileged access management requires users to request just-in-time access to complete elevated and privileged tasks through a highly scoped and time-bounded approval workflow. This configuration gives users just-enough-access to perform the task at hand, without risking exposure of sensitive data or critical configuration settings. Microsoft 365 configuration settings. When used with Microsoft Entra Privileged Identity Management, these two features provide access control with just-in-time access at different scopes. (e.g., Encryption, RBAC, Conditional Access, JIT, Just Enough Access (with Approval).
License requirements: M365 E5 customers.
References
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EID-RBAC-E3 | Role Based Access Control | Technique Scores | T1098 | Account Manipulation |
Comments
The RBAC control can generally be used to implement the principle of least privilege to protect against the number of accounts with management capabilities. This has Partial coverage of Account Manipulation sub-techniques, resulting in an overall score of Partial.
License Requirements:
ME-ID Built-in Roles (Free)
References
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DEF-LM-E5 | Lateral Movements | Technique Scores | T1098 | Account Manipulation |
Comments
Defender for Identity LMPs are visual guides that help you quickly understand and identify exactly how attackers can move laterally inside your network. The purpose of lateral movements within the cyber-attack kill chain are for attackers to gain and compromise your sensitive accounts using non-sensitive accounts. Compromising your sensitive accounts gets them another step closer to their ultimate goal, domain dominance. To stop these attacks from being successful, Defender for Identity LMPs give you easy to interpret, direct visual guidance on your most vulnerable, sensitive accounts.
References
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EID-MFA-E3 | Multifactor Authentication | Technique Scores | T1098 | Account Manipulation |
Comments
Requiring the use of MFA along with conditional access policies may reduce the likelihood of adversaries making credential modifications, administrator changes, account manipulation, changes to permissions, etc.
References
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EID-PIM-E5 | Privileged Identity Management | Technique Scores | T1098 | Account Manipulation |
Comments
This control provides significant protection for some of this technique's sub-techniques while not providing any protection for others, resulting in a Partial score.
References
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EID-PIM-E5 | Privileged Identity Management | Technique Scores | T1098 | Account Manipulation |
Comments
This control only provides detection for one of this technique's sub-techniques while not providing any detection for the remaining and therefore its coverage score is Minimal, resulting in a Minimal score.
References
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EID-PIM-E5 | Privileged Identity Management | Technique Scores | T1098 | Account Manipulation |
Comments
The PIM control can assist post-execution detection by alerting on the assignment of privileged Additional Cloud Roles. This is not extendable to detect against the technique's other sub-techniques, resulting in overall minimal detection coverage.
License Requirements:
Microsoft Entra ID P2 or Microsoft Entra ID Governance
References
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EID-PIM-E5 | Privileged Identity Management | Technique Scores | T1098 | Account Manipulation |
Comments
The PIM control provides significant protection against multiple sub-techniques, although not all, resulting in partial coverage. The control scores Significant for the temporal aspects of its protection, which include requiring activation by eligible privileged roles, and confirming user identity with MFA before execution.
License Requirements:
Microsoft Entra ID P2 or Microsoft Entra ID Governance
References
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Technique ID | Technique Name | Number of Mappings |
---|---|---|
T1098.003 | Additional Cloud Roles | 37 |
T1098.006 | Additional Container Cluster Roles | 18 |
T1098.007 | Additional Local or Domain Groups | 16 |
T1098.004 | SSH Authorized Keys | 26 |
T1098.005 | Device Registration | 17 |
T1098.001 | Additional Cloud Credentials | 53 |
T1098.002 | Additional Email Delegate Permissions | 23 |