Adversaries may chain together multiple proxies to disguise the source of malicious traffic. Typically, a defender will be able to identify the last proxy traffic traversed before it enters their network; the defender may or may not be able to identify any previous proxies before the last-hop proxy. This technique makes identifying the original source of the malicious traffic even more difficult by requiring the defender to trace malicious traffic through several proxies to identify its source.
For example, adversaries may construct or use onion routing networks – such as the publicly available Tor network – to transport encrypted C2 traffic through a compromised population, allowing communication with any device within the network.(Citation: Onion Routing) Adversaries may also use operational relay box (ORB) networks composed of virtual private servers (VPS), Internet of Things (IoT) devices, smart devices, and end-of-life routers to obfuscate their operations. (Citation: ORB Mandiant)
In the case of network infrastructure, it is possible for an adversary to leverage multiple compromised devices to create a multi-hop proxy chain (i.e., Network Devices). By leveraging Patch System Image on routers, adversaries can add custom code to the affected network devices that will implement onion routing between those nodes. This method is dependent upon the Network Boundary Bridging method allowing the adversaries to cross the protected network boundary of the Internet perimeter and into the organization’s Wide-Area Network (WAN). Protocols such as ICMP may be used as a transport.
Similarly, adversaries may abuse peer-to-peer (P2P) and blockchain-oriented infrastructure to implement routing between a decentralized network of peers.(Citation: NGLite Trojan)
View in MITRE ATT&CK®Capability ID | Capability Description | Mapping Type | ATT&CK ID | ATT&CK Name | Notes |
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PR.IR-04.01 | Utilization monitoring | Mitigates | T1090.003 | Multi-hop Proxy |
Comments
This diagnostic statement describes how the organization establishes and manages baseline measures of network activity. Supported by network monitoring tools and other controls to detect events and identify incidents. Mitigating mechanisms may include: Data Loss Prevention (DLP); Filtering Network Traffic; Limit Network Traffic; Network Intrusion Prevention Systems (NIPS); and Network Segmentation for these type of network-based techniques.
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PR.IR-01.03 | Network communications integrity and availability | Mitigates | T1090.003 | Multi-hop Proxy |
Comments
This diagnostic statement protects against Multi-hop Proxy through the use of secure network configurations, architecture, implementations of zero trust architecture, and segmentation.
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PR.PS-01.08 | End-user device protection | Mitigates | T1090.003 | Multi-hop Proxy |
Comments
This diagnostic statement protects against Multi-hop Proxy through the use of limiting access to resources to only authorized devices, management of personal computing devices, network intrusion prevention, and the use of antimalware.
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Capability ID | Capability Description | Mapping Type | ATT&CK ID | ATT&CK Name | Notes |
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CA-07 | Continuous Monitoring | mitigates | T1090.003 | Multi-hop Proxy | |
CM-06 | Configuration Settings | mitigates | T1090.003 | Multi-hop Proxy | |
SI-10 | Information Input Validation | mitigates | T1090.003 | Multi-hop Proxy | |
SI-15 | Information Output Filtering | mitigates | T1090.003 | Multi-hop Proxy | |
CM-07 | Least Functionality | mitigates | T1090.003 | Multi-hop Proxy | |
AC-03 | Access Enforcement | mitigates | T1090.003 | Multi-hop Proxy | |
AC-04 | Information Flow Enforcement | mitigates | T1090.003 | Multi-hop Proxy | |
SC-07 | Boundary Protection | mitigates | T1090.003 | Multi-hop Proxy |
Capability ID | Capability Description | Mapping Type | ATT&CK ID | ATT&CK Name | Notes |
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ai_threat_protection | Microsoft Defender for Cloud: AI Threat Protection | technique_scores | T1090.003 | Multi-hop Proxy |
Comments
This capability can detect (alert: AI.Azure_AccessFromAnonymizedIP) when an AI is accessed from a Tor network IP.
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azure_network_security_groups | Azure Network Security Groups | technique_scores | T1090.003 | Multi-hop Proxy |
Comments
This control can restrict access between systems, enclaves, and workloads thereby mitigating these proxy related sub-techniques.
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azure_network_watcher_traffic_analytics | Azure Network Watcher: Traffic Analytics | technique_scores | T1090.003 | Multi-hop Proxy |
Comments
This control can detect abuse of multi-hop proxies.
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Capability ID | Capability Description | Mapping Type | ATT&CK ID | ATT&CK Name | Notes |
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amazon_guardduty | Amazon GuardDuty | technique_scores | T1090.003 | Multi-hop Proxy |
Comments
The UnauthorizedAccess:EC2/TorClient GuardDuty finding type flags events where adversaries may use a connection proxy to direct network traffic between systems or act as an intermediary for network communications to a command-and-control server to avoid direct connections to their infrastructure.
Due to the detection being limited to a specific type of proxy, Tor, its coverage is Minimal resulting in a Minimal score.
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amazon_virtual_private_cloud | Amazon Virtual Private Cloud | technique_scores | T1090.003 | Multi-hop Proxy |
Comments
VPC security groups and network access control lists (NACLs) can restrict access between systems, enclaves, and workloads thereby mitigating these proxy related sub-techniques.
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aws_network_firewall | AWS Network Firewall | technique_scores | T1090.003 | Multi-hop Proxy |
Comments
AWS Network Firewall has the ability to pass, drop, or alert on traffic based on the network protocol as well as perform deep packet inspection on the payload. This functionality can be used to block traffic from known bad IP addresses and to known bad domains that serve as proxies for adversaries. This mapping is given a score of partial because it only blocks known bad IP addresses and domains and does not protect against unknown ones.
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aws_web_application_firewall | AWS Web Application Firewall | technique_scores | T1090.003 | Multi-hop Proxy |
Comments
The AWS WAF protects web applications from access by adversaries that leverage tools that obscure their identity (e.g., VPN, proxies, Tor, hosting providers). AWS WAF provides this protection via the following rule set that blocks incoming traffic from IP addresses known to anonymize connection information or be less likely to source end user traffic.
AWSManagedRulesAnonymousIpList
This is given a score of Partial because it provide protections based only on known IP addresses. Furthermore, it blocks the malicious content in near real-time.
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