Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of cloud accounts. Cloud accounts are those created and configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration of resources within a cloud service provider or SaaS application.
With authenticated access there are several tools that can be used to find accounts. The <code>Get-MsolRoleMember</code> PowerShell cmdlet can be used to obtain account names given a role or permissions group in Office 365.(Citation: Microsoft msolrolemember)(Citation: GitHub Raindance) The Azure CLI (AZ CLI) also provides an interface to obtain user accounts with authenticated access to a domain. The command <code>az ad user list</code> will list all users within a domain.(Citation: Microsoft AZ CLI)(Citation: Black Hills Red Teaming MS AD Azure, 2018)
The AWS command <code>aws iam list-users</code> may be used to obtain a list of users in the current account while <code>aws iam list-roles</code> can obtain IAM roles that have a specified path prefix.(Citation: AWS List Roles)(Citation: AWS List Users) In GCP, <code>gcloud iam service-accounts list</code> and <code>gcloud projects get-iam-policy</code> may be used to obtain a listing of service accounts and users in a project.(Citation: Google Cloud - IAM Servie Accounts List API)
View in MITRE ATT&CK®| Capability ID | Capability Description | Mapping Type | ATT&CK ID | ATT&CK Name | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| PR.AA-04.01 | Access control within and across security perimeters | Mitigates | T1087.004 | Cloud Account |
Comments
This diagnostic statement provides protection from Cloud Account through the implementation of privileged account management controls to limit credential access. Employing limitations to specific accounts, access control mechanisms, and auditing the attribution logs provides protection against adversaries attempting to modify accounts.
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| PR.AA-05.01 | Access privilege limitation | Mitigates | T1087.004 | Cloud Account |
Comments
This diagnostic statement describes the implementation of least privilege principle, which can be applied to limiting permissions through role-based access controls, file and directory permissions, and the execution of systems and services. An adversary must already have high-level, admin or root level access on a local system to make full use of these ATT&CK techniques. Restrict users and accounts to the least privileges they require can help mitigate these techniques.
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| PR.AA-01.02 | Physical and logical access | Mitigates | T1087.004 | Cloud Account |
Comments
This diagnostic statement describes how the organization ensures users are identified and authenticated before accessing systems, applications, and hardware, with logical access controls permitting access only to authorized individuals with legitimate business needs. Logical access controls in relation to systems can refer to the use of MFA, user account management, and other role-based access control mechanisms to enforce policies for authentication and authorization of user accounts.
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| PR.AA-01.01 | Identity and credential management | Mitigates | T1087.004 | Cloud Account |
Comments
This diagnostic statement protects against Cloud Account through the use of hardened access control policies, secure defaults, password complexity requirements, multifactor authentication requirements, and removal of terminated accounts.
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| Capability ID | Capability Description | Mapping Type | ATT&CK ID | ATT&CK Name | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| IA-08 | Identification and Authentication (Non-Organizational Users) | mitigates | T1087.004 | Cloud Account | |
| IA-02 | Identification and Authentication (Organizational Users) | mitigates | T1087.004 | Cloud Account | |
| AC-02 | Account Management | mitigates | T1087.004 | Cloud Account | |
| AC-03 | Access Enforcement | mitigates | T1087.004 | Cloud Account | |
| AC-05 | Separation of Duties | mitigates | T1087.004 | Cloud Account | |
| AC-06 | Least Privilege | mitigates | T1087.004 | Cloud Account |
| Capability ID | Capability Description | Mapping Type | ATT&CK ID | ATT&CK Name | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| azure_role_based_access_control | Azure Role-Based Access Control | technique_scores | T1087.004 | Cloud Account |
Comments
This control can be used to implement the least-privilege principle for account management and thereby limit the accounts that can be used for account discovery.
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| defender_for_resource_manager | Microsoft Defender for Resource Manager | technique_scores | T1087.004 | Cloud Account |
Comments
This control may alert on Account Discovery of Cloud Accounts activity generated by specific toolkits, such as MicroBurst, PowerZure, etc. It may not generate alerts on undocumented discovery techniques or exploitation toolkits. The following alerts may be generated: "PowerZure exploitation toolkit used to enumerate storage containers, shares, and tables", "PowerZure exploitation toolkit used to enumerate resources", "MicroBurst exploitation toolkit used to enumerate resources in your subscriptions", "Azurite toolkit run detected".
References
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| Capability ID | Capability Description | Mapping Type | ATT&CK ID | ATT&CK Name | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| google_secops | Google Security Operations | technique_scores | T1087.004 | Cloud Account |
Comments
Google Security Ops is able to trigger an alert based off command line arguments and suspicious system processes that could indicate adversary's account discovery techniques (e.g., "net user /domain", "C:\\Windows\\System32\\net.exe", "C:\\Windows\\System32\\query.exe).
This technique was scored as minimal based on low or uncertain detection coverage factor.
https://github.com/chronicle/detection-rules/blob/783e0e5947774785db1c55041b70176deeca6f46/soc_prime_rules/threat_hunting/windows/account_discovery_activity_detector__sysmon_behavior.yaral
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| identity_and_access_management | Identity and Access Management | technique_scores | T1087.004 | Cloud Account |
Comments
This control can be used to implement the least-privilege principle for account management and thereby limit the accounts that can be used for account discovery. This control receives a minimal score since it only covers one of the few sub-techniques.
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| identity_platform | Identity Platform | technique_scores | T1087.004 | Cloud Account |
Comments
Identity Platform is a customer identity and access management (CIAM) platform that helps organizations add identity and access management functionality to their applications, protect user accounts, and scale with confidence on Google Cloud. With this, permissions are limited to discover cloud accounts in accordance with least privilege and adversaries may be prevented from getting access to a listing of cloud accounts.
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| policy_intelligence | Policy Intelligence | technique_scores | T1087.004 | Cloud Account |
Comments
This control can be used to limit permissions to discover cloud accounts in accordance with least privilege principles and thereby limits the accounts that can be used for account discovery.
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| resource_manager | Resource Manager | technique_scores | T1087.004 | Cloud Account |
Comments
This control may mitigate adversaries that attempt to get a listing of cloud accounts, such as use of calls to cloud APIs that perform account discovery.
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| resource_manager | Resource Manager | technique_scores | T1087.004 | Cloud Account |
Comments
Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of cloud accounts that are created and configured by an organization or admin. IAM audit logging in GCP can be used to determine roles and permissions, along with routinely checking user permissions to ensure only the expected users have the ability to list IAM identities or otherwise discover cloud accounts.
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| Capability ID | Capability Description | Mapping Type | ATT&CK ID | ATT&CK Name | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| aws_organizations | AWS Organizations | technique_scores | T1087.004 | Cloud Account |
Comments
This control may protect against cloud account discovery by segmenting accounts into separate organizational units and restricting to least privileges between groups.
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