Adversaries may delete or modify artifacts generated within systems to remove evidence of their presence or hinder defenses. Various artifacts may be created by an adversary or something that can be attributed to an adversary’s actions. Typically these artifacts are used as defensive indicators related to monitored events, such as strings from downloaded files, logs that are generated from user actions, and other data analyzed by defenders. Location, format, and type of artifact (such as command or login history) are often specific to each platform.
Removal of these indicators may interfere with event collection, reporting, or other processes used to detect intrusion activity. This may compromise the integrity of security solutions by causing notable events to go unreported. This activity may also impede forensic analysis and incident response, due to lack of sufficient data to determine what occurred.
View in MITRE ATT&CK®| Capability ID | Capability Description | Mapping Type | ATT&CK ID | ATT&CK Name | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| PR.DS-10.01 | Data-in-use protection | Mitigates | T1070 | Indicator Removal |
Comments
This Diagnostic Statement describes mitigations related to protecting data-in-use, mentioning encryption, access control methods and authentication. Using encryption for data-in-use, alongside other safeguards such for restricting exfiltration of sensitive data aid with mitigating collection and exfiltration threats.
References
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| PR.PS-01.06 | Encryption management practices | Mitigates | T1070 | Indicator Removal |
Comments
This diagnostic statement is associated with employing encryption methods to mitigate unauthorized access or theft of data that protect the confidentiality and integrity of data-at-rest, data-in-use, and data-in-transit. To address threats to indicator removal techniques, obfuscate/encrypt event files locally and in transit to avoid giving feedback to an adversary.
References
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| PR.PS-01.07 | Cryptographic keys and certificates | Mitigates | T1070 | Indicator Removal |
Comments
This diagnostic statement protects against Indicator Removal through the use of key management. Employing key protection strategies for key material used in protection of indicators, limitations to specific accounts along with access control mechanisms provides protection against adversaries trying to remove indicators of compromise.
References
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| ID.AM-08.03 | Data governance and lifecycle management | Mitigates | T1070 | Indicator Removal |
Comments
Storing data remotely can be used to properly manage data so that adversaries won't be able to interfere with processes used to detect intrusion activities. There may be some similarities to NIST 800-53 SI-12 Information Management and Retention. This may provide mitigation of data access/exfiltration techniques.
References
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| ID.AM-08.05 | Data destruction procedures | Mitigates | T1070 | Indicator Removal |
Comments
Storing data remotely can be used to properly manage data so that adversaries won't be able to interfere with processes used to detect intrusion activities. There may be some similarities to NIST 800-53 SI-12 Information Management and Retention. This may provide mitigation of data access/exfiltration techniques.
References
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| PR.PS-01.05 | Encryption standards | Mitigates | T1070 | Indicator Removal |
Comments
This diagnostic statement is associated with employing strong encryption methods to mitigate unauthorized access or theft of data that protect the confidentiality and integrity of data-at-rest, data-in-use, and data-in-transit. To address threats to indicator removal techniques, obfuscate/encrypt event files locally and in transit to avoid giving feedback to an adversary.
References
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| Capability ID | Capability Description | Mapping Type | ATT&CK ID | ATT&CK Name | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| action.malware.variety.Export data | Export data to another site or system | related-to | T1070 | Indicator Removal |
| Capability ID | Capability Description | Mapping Type | ATT&CK ID | ATT&CK Name | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| alerts_for_linux_machines | Alerts for Linux Machines | technique_scores | T1070 | Indicator Removal |
Comments
This control is only relevant for Linux environments and provides partial coverage for multiple Linux-relevant sub-techniques.
References
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| alerts_for_windows_machines | Alerts for Windows Machines | technique_scores | T1070 | Indicator Removal |
Comments
This control's detection is specific to a minority of this technique's sub-techniques and procedure examples resulting in a Minimal Coverage score and consequently an overall score of Minimal.
References
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| defender_for_containers | Microsoft Defender for Containers | technique_scores | T1070 | Indicator Removal |
Comments
This control may alert on deletion of Kubernetes events. Attackers might delete those events for hiding their operations in the cluster. There is no relevant sub-technique for this control but the parent applies.
References
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| Capability ID | Capability Description | Mapping Type | ATT&CK ID | ATT&CK Name | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| google_secops | Google Security Operations | technique_scores | T1070 | Indicator Removal |
Comments
Google Security Operations is able to trigger an alert when logs are cleared from the infrastructure.
This technique was scored as minimal based on low or uncertain detection coverage factor.
https://github.com/chronicle/detection-rules/blob/main/gcp_cloudaudit/gcp_log_deletion.yaral
References
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| security_command_center | Security Command Center | technique_scores | T1070 | Indicator Removal |
Comments
SCC is able to detect when audit logging has been disabled for a resource. Adversaries may use this weakness to hide their activity and remove evidence of their presence (e.g., clear command history, clear logs, file deletion). This technique was graded as significant due to the high detect coverage and real-time temporal factor.
References
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| Capability ID | Capability Description | Mapping Type | ATT&CK ID | ATT&CK Name | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| amazon_inspector | Amazon Inspector | technique_scores | T1070 | Indicator Removal on Host |
Comments
The Amazon Inspector Best Practices assessment package can assess security control "Configure permissions for system directories" that prevents privilege escalation by local users and ensures only the root account can modify/execute system configuration information and binaries. Amazon Inspector does not directly protect against system modifications rather it just checks to see if security controls are in place which can inform decisions around hardening the system. Furthermore, Amazon Inspector only supports a subset of the sub-techniques for this technique. Due to these things and the fact the security control is only supported for Linux platforms, the score is Minimal.
References
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| Technique ID | Technique Name | Number of Mappings |
|---|---|---|
| T1070.002 | Clear Linux or Mac System Logs | 30 |
| T1070.007 | Clear Network Connection History and Configurations | 14 |
| T1070.003 | Clear Command History | 12 |
| T1070.008 | Clear Mailbox Data | 29 |
| T1070.006 | Timestomp | 4 |
| T1070.001 | Clear Windows Event Logs | 29 |
| T1070.005 | Network Share Connection Removal | 2 |
| T1070.010 | Relocate Malware | 6 |
| T1070.009 | Clear Persistence | 14 |
| T1070.004 | File Deletion | 3 |