Context to Determine Intent¶
Our research on ambiguous techniques led us to classify three different types of context that a defender may need in order to distill an actor’s intent: peripheral-level, chain-level, and technique-level. These contexts provide needed information surround the usage of a technique, which is critical for determining intent.
Peripheral-Level Context¶

Peripheral-Level Context can be understood as an “outside-looking-in” perspective. This category focuses on external information that is most valuable for defending against potential attacks targeting your network.
Many of the techniques within this category are associated with pre-compromise activities, such as those in the Reconnaissance tactic. As a result, the detections generated in this category are primarily proactive in nature, rather than traditional queries that can be directly implemented in a Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) system. Instead, these detections emphasize cyber threat intelligence on emerging threats to your network, industry, or sector. This approach supports the development of both behavior-based and signature-based defenses, enabling organizations to better anticipate and mitigate risks before they materialize.
Chain-Level Context¶

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Chain-level context focuses on observing co-occurring techniques—those that occur before, after, or concurrently with a specific technique of interest—in order to establish intent. We examined chain-level context techniques by leveraging data from our repository of Attack Flows and our Adversary Emulation Library.
Using Archiving Collected Data as an example, we examined infamous breaches and mapped out the activities occurring immediately before, after, or concurrent to the technique to identify patterns and trends. We used a color-coded system based on tactics, which helped highlight trends more effectively. For example, one notable trend we observed was the frequent occurrence of Exfiltration (seen above in brown) immediately following the archiving of collected data. This trend informed our understanding of the attack chains and what activity we could anticipate seeing around Archiving Collected Data that would point to it being employed with malicious intent.
The determination of malicious intent in this context relied on analyzing historical attack chains and recurring patterns. One consideration during this process was the length of the attack chain. In most cases, the analytics we developed focused on chaining together two techniques. While it is possible to chain together more techniques, there is a trade-off between chain length and the accuracy and precision of the analysis. Longer chains may exclude relevant activity that would otherwise be captured, so finding an optimal balance between chain length, the number of techniques linked, and the desired level of accuracy and precision is critical.
Technique-Level Context¶

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Technique-level context focuses on artifacts related to the detection of a single technique. To determine technique-level context, we distill the detection criteria into four general categories: Who, What, When, & Where.
Who: Authentication and privileges, examining who is operating within the network, the privileges they are using, and how they are attempting to access resources. It provides insight into user behavior and access patterns.
What: Traditional event artifacts, such as flags, commands, specific registry keys, API calls, and other concrete artifacts that can be extracted from event codes or event IDs.
When: Analyzes access patterns, including the frequency of activity and whether operations are occurring outside of typical or expected hours. It helps identify anomalies in the timing of activity that may indicate malicious intent.
Where: Examines the key terrain within a network. This includes monitoring critical files, locations, or systems, as well as examining network connections. By establishing a baseline, organizations can detect abnormal connections or flows, such as new connections being initiated or unexpected destinations being accessed.
By organizing detection criteria into these categories, we provide a structured approach to developing detection analytics and identifying technique-level differentiators. This framework enables defenders to focus on key aspects of network activity - authentication, artifacts, timing, and terrain - while leveraging baseline data and behavioral analysis to detect anomalies and differentiate between benign and malicious behavior.
How to Use Context to Determine Intent¶

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The flowchart represents the progression of activities during an incident, and which type of context to use as a defender. The flow starts from the onset of the attack behavior and moves toward behavioral specifics. The legend at the bottom-left highlights the different contexts, with gray representing not enough information to make a determination. We have broken the flowchart into 5 stages:
- Attack:
Pre-Compromise Activities: Actions that occur before the adversary has breached the network, e.g. Reconnaissance.
Post-Compromise Activities: Actions that occur after an adversary has gained access into the network, e.g. Inital Access
- Tool Usage:
Adversary-brought Tools: software brought in by an adversary to accomplish an attack, and used in a way that clearly indicates malicious intent, e.g. Mimikatz
Pre-existing Tools: software or functionality that existed on the system pre-compromise, and used in a way that does not indicate malicious intent, e.g. PowerShell
- Operation Types:
Non-Standard Operation: Involves actions that deviate from intended usage of a tool in an identifiable manner, which would be presumed to be malicious.
Standard Operation: Includes intended user activities, either by legitimate users or adversaries
- User Access:
Non-Legitimate User Access: Includes actions by adversaries meant to directly manipulate systems or deceive legitimate users.
Legitimate User Access: Includes actions by legitimate users or adversaries using stolen credentials or tokens.
- Behavioral Outcomes:
Identifiable Modifications/Artifacts: Detectable changes in systems or behaviors that could indicate malicious activity, e.g. Scheduled Task
Indistinguishable Usage: Actions that mimic normal user behavior without identifiable modifications, e.g. LSASS Memory Access
Performing Expected Actions: Legitimate activity aligned with normal behavior expectations, e.g. Valid Accounts.
Performing Abnormal Actions: Deviations from expected behavior, which may indicate malicious activity, e.g. Archive Collected Data.