Develop systems, products, and business practices based upon a principle of security by design and industry best practices.
| Capability ID | Capability Description | Mapping Type | ATT&CK ID | ATT&CK Name | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DSP-07 | Data Protection by Design and Default | mitigates | T1078 | Valid Accounts |
Comments
Data protection by design and default is emphasized in this control, requiring proactive integration of security and privacy measures at every stage of the SDLC and across all components. Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. In terms of mitigations, ensure that applications do not store sensitive data or credentials insecurely. (e.g. plaintext credentials in code, published credentials in repositories, or credentials in public cloud storage). Applications and appliances that utilize default username and password should be changed immediately after the installation, and before deployment to a production environment.
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| DSP-07 | Data Protection by Design and Default | mitigates | T1550.001 | Application Access Token |
Comments
Data protection by design and default is emphasized in this control, requiring proactive integration of security and privacy measures at every stage of the SDLC and across all components. Adversaries may use stolen application access tokens to bypass the typical authentication process and access restricted accounts, information, or services on remote systems. In terms of mitigation, consider implementing token binding strategies that cryptographically bind a token to a secret. This may prevent the token from being used without knowledge of the secret or possession of the device the token is tied to
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| DSP-07 | Data Protection by Design and Default | mitigates | T1550 | Use Alternate Authentication Material |
Comments
Data protection by design and default is emphasized in this control, requiring proactive integration of security and privacy measures at every stage of the SDLC and across all components. Adversaries may use alternate authentication material, such as password hashes, Kerberos tickets, and application access tokens, in order to move laterally within an environment and bypass normal system access controls. In terms of mitigation, consider implementing token binding strategies that cryptographically bind a token to a secret. This may prevent the token from being used without knowledge of the secret or possession of the device the token is tied to
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| DSP-07 | Data Protection by Design and Default | mitigates | T1195.001 | Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools |
Comments
Data protection by design and default is emphasized in this control, requiring proactive integration of security and privacy measures at every stage of the SDLC and across all components. Applications often depend on external software to function properly. Popular open source projects that are used as dependencies in many applications may be targeted as a means to add malicious code to users of the dependency. In terms of mitigation, application developers should be cautious when selecting third-party libraries to integrate into their application. Additionally, where possible, developers should lock software dependencies to specific versions that are known to be secure rather than pulling the latest version on build.
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| DSP-07 | Data Protection by Design and Default | mitigates | T1195 | Supply Chain Compromise |
Comments
Data protection by design and default is emphasized in this control, requiring proactive integration of security and privacy measures at every stage of the SDLC and across all components. Adversaries may manipulate products or product delivery mechanisms prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise. In terms of mitigation, application developers should be cautious when selecting third-party libraries to integrate into their application. Additionally, where possible, developers should lock software dependencies to specific versions that are known to be secure rather than pulling the latest version on build.
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| DSP-07 | Data Protection by Design and Default | mitigates | T1559 | Inter-Process Communication |
Comments
Data protection by design and default is emphasized in this control, requiring proactive integration of security and privacy measures at every stage of the SDLC and across all components. Adversaries may abuse inter-process communication (IPC) mechanisms for local code or command execution. When it comes to mitigation from this control to this technique, ensuring all COM alerts and Protected View are enabled and enable the Hardened Runtime capability when developing applications.
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| DSP-07 | Data Protection by Design and Default | mitigates | T1574.001 | DLL |
Comments
Data protection by design and default is emphasized in this control, requiring proactive integration of security and privacy measures at every stage of the SDLC and across all components. Adversaries may abuse dynamic-link library files (DLLs) in order to achieve persistence, escalate privileges, and evade defenses. In terms of mitigation, when possible, the inclusion hash values in manifest files may help prevent side-loading of malicious libraries.
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| DSP-07 | Data Protection by Design and Default | mitigates | T1574 | Hijack Execution Flow |
Comments
Data protection by design and default is emphasized in this control, requiring proactive integration of security and privacy measures at every stage of the SDLC and across all components. For this technique, adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the way operating systems run programs. To mitigate when possible, include hash values in manifest files to help prevent side-loading of malicious libraries.
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| DSP-07 | Data Protection by Design and Default | mitigates | T1212 | Exploitation for Credential Access |
Comments
Data protection by design and default is emphasized in this control, requiring proactive integration of security and privacy measures at every stage of the SDLC and across all components. For this technique, adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities in an attempt to collect credentials. Mitigation use-cases include application developers considering taking measures to validate authentication requests by enabling one-time passwords, providing timestamps or sequence numbers for messages sent, using digital signatures, and/or using random session keys.
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