Adversaries may communicate using application layer protocols to avoid detection/network filtering by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server.
Adversaries may utilize many different protocols, including those used for web browsing, transferring files, electronic mail, or DNS. For connections that occur internally within an enclave (such as those between a proxy or pivot node and other nodes), commonly used protocols are SMB, SSH, or RDP.
View in MITRE ATT&CK®Capability ID | Capability Description | Mapping Type | ATT&CK ID | ATT&CK Name | Notes |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
AC-4 | Information Flow Enforcement | Protects | T1071 | Application Layer Protocol | |
CA-7 | Continuous Monitoring | Protects | T1071 | Application Layer Protocol | |
CM-2 | Baseline Configuration | Protects | T1071 | Application Layer Protocol | |
CM-6 | Configuration Settings | Protects | T1071 | Application Layer Protocol | |
CM-7 | Least Functionality | Protects | T1071 | Application Layer Protocol | |
SC-10 | Network Disconnect | Protects | T1071 | Application Layer Protocol | |
SC-20 | Secure Name/address Resolution Service (authoritative Source) | Protects | T1071 | Application Layer Protocol | |
SC-21 | Secure Name/address Resolution Service (recursive or Caching Resolver) | Protects | T1071 | Application Layer Protocol | |
SC-22 | Architecture and Provisioning for Name/address Resolution Service | Protects | T1071 | Application Layer Protocol | |
SC-23 | Session Authenticity | Protects | T1071 | Application Layer Protocol | |
SC-31 | Covert Channel Analysis | Protects | T1071 | Application Layer Protocol | |
SC-37 | Out-of-band Channels | Protects | T1071 | Application Layer Protocol | |
SC-7 | Boundary Protection | Protects | T1071 | Application Layer Protocol | |
SI-3 | Malicious Code Protection | Protects | T1071 | Application Layer Protocol | |
SI-4 | System Monitoring | Protects | T1071 | Application Layer Protocol | |
action.hacking.variety.Use of backdoor or C2 | Use of Backdoor or C2 channel | related-to | T1071 | Application Layer Protocol | |
action.hacking.vector.Backdoor or C2 | Backdoor or command and control channel | related-to | T1071 | Application Layer Protocol | |
action.malware.variety.C2 | Command and control (C2) | related-to | T1071 | Application Layer Protocol | |
action.malware.variety.Unknown | Unknown | related-to | T1071 | Application Layer Protocol | |
amazon_guardduty | Amazon GuardDuty | technique_scores | T1071 | Application Layer Protocol |
Comments
GuardDuty flags events matching the following finding types that relate to adversaries attempting to communicate using application layer protocols to avoid detection.
UnauthorizedAccess:EC2/MaliciousIPCaller.Custom Trojan:EC2/DropPoint!DNS Trojan:EC2/DropPoint Backdoor:EC2/C&CActivity.B!DNS Trojan:EC2/BlackholeTraffic Trojan:EC2/BlackholeTraffic!DNS
References
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aws_iot_device_defender | AWS IoT Device Defender | technique_scores | T1071 | Application Layer Protocol |
Comments
The following AWS IoT Device Defender cloud-side detection metrics can detect indicators that an adversary may be leveraging compromised AWS IoT devices and application layer protocols - especially the Message Queuing Telemetry Transport (MQTT) protocol - to communicate for command and control purposes: "Source IP" ("aws:source-ip-address") values outside of expected IP address ranges may suggest that a device has been stolen. "Messages sent" ("aws:num-messages-sent"), "Messages received" ("aws:num-messages-received"), and "Message size" ("aws:message-byte-size") values outside of expected norms may indicate that devices are sending and/or receiving non-standard traffic, which may include command and control traffic.
The following AWS IoT Device Defender device-side detection metrics can detect indicators that an adversary may be leveraging compromised AWS IoT devices and application layer protocols - especially the Message Queuing Telemetry Transport (MQTT) protocol - to communicate for command and control purposes: "Destination IPs" ("aws:destination-ip-addresses") outside of expected IP address ranges may suggest that a device is communicating with unexpected parties. "Bytes in" ("aws:all-bytes-in"), "Bytes out" ("aws:all-bytes-out"), "Packets in" ("aws:all-packets-in"), and "Packets out" ("aws:all-packets-out") values outside of expected norms may indicate that the device is sending and/or receiving non-standard traffic, which may include command and control traffic. "Listening TCP ports" ("aws:listening-tcp-ports"), "Listening TCP port count" ("aws:num-listening-tcp-ports"), "Established TCP connections count" ("aws:num-established-tcp-connections"), "Listening UDP ports" ("aws:listening-udp-ports"), and "Listening UDP port count" ("aws:num-listening-udp-ports") values outside of expected norms may indicate that devices are communicating via unexpected ports/protocols that may suggest application layer command and control traffic.
Coverage factor is minimal, since these metrics are limited to IoT device communication and none of this technique's sub-techniques are addressed, resulting in an overall score of Minimal.
References
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aws_web_application_firewall | AWS Web Application Firewall | technique_scores | T1071 | Application Layer Protocol |
Comments
AWS WAF protects against this by inspecting incoming requests and blocking malicious traffic. AWS WAF uses the following rule sets to provide this protection.
AWSManagedRulesCommonRuleSet AWSManagedRulesAdminProtectionRuleSet AWSManagedRulesKnownBadInputsRuleSet AWSManagedRulesSQLiRuleSet AWSManagedRulesLinuxRuleSet AWSManagedRulesUnixRuleSet AWSManagedRulesWindowsRuleSet AWSManagedRulesPHPRuleSet AWSManagedRulesWordPressRuleSet AWSManagedRulesBotControlRuleSet
This is scored as Minimal because the rule sets only protect against a subset of the sub-techniques (1 of 4).
References
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aws_network_firewall | AWS Network Firewall | technique_scores | T1071 | Application Layer Protocol |
Comments
AWS Network Firewall has the ability to pass, drop, or alert on traffic based on the network protocol as well as perform deep packet inspection on the payload. This functionality can be used to block malicious or unwanted traffic leveraging application layer protocols. Given this supports all sub-techniques, the mapping is given a score of Significant.
References
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Technique ID | Technique Name | Number of Mappings |
---|---|---|
T1071.004 | DNS | 22 |
T1071.002 | File Transfer Protocols | 19 |
T1071.003 | Mail Protocols | 19 |
T1071.001 | Web Protocols | 20 |