T1195 Supply Chain Compromise

Adversaries may manipulate products or product delivery mechanisms prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise.

Supply chain compromise can take place at any stage of the supply chain including:

  • Manipulation of development tools
  • Manipulation of a development environment
  • Manipulation of source code repositories (public or private)
  • Manipulation of source code in open-source dependencies
  • Manipulation of software update/distribution mechanisms
  • Compromised/infected system images (multiple cases of removable media infected at the factory)(Citation: IBM Storwize)(Citation: Schneider Electric USB Malware)
  • Replacement of legitimate software with modified versions
  • Sales of modified/counterfeit products to legitimate distributors
  • Shipment interdiction

While supply chain compromise can impact any component of hardware or software, adversaries looking to gain execution have often focused on malicious additions to legitimate software in software distribution or update channels.(Citation: Avast CCleaner3 2018)(Citation: Microsoft Dofoil 2018)(Citation: Command Five SK 2011) Targeting may be specific to a desired victim set or malicious software may be distributed to a broad set of consumers but only move on to additional tactics on specific victims.(Citation: Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012)(Citation: Avast CCleaner3 2018)(Citation: Command Five SK 2011) Popular open source projects that are used as dependencies in many applications may also be targeted as a means to add malicious code to users of the dependency.(Citation: Trendmicro NPM Compromise)

View in MITRE ATT&CK®

CSA CCM Mappings

Capability ID Capability Description Mapping Type ATT&CK ID ATT&CK Name Notes
STA-16 Supply Chain Data Security Assessment mitigates T1195 Supply Chain Compromise
Comments
The mitigative applications of this control relate to (e) "software supply chain risk management practices for ensuring software integrity, traceability, and provenance (e.g., software build practices, component management, and use of Software Bill of Materials (SBOMs))" SBOMs are known to provide transparency into software components, which may enable the identification of vulnerable software libraries, components, or code and mitigate the injection or execution of vulnerable or malicious code.
References
    TVM-06 External Library Vulnerabilities mitigates T1195 Supply Chain Compromise
    Comments
    This control requires both CSP and CSC to independently manage third-party and open-source libraries by maintaining accurate inventories, integrating with vulnerability databases, automating patching and updates, using dependency and scanning tools to mitigate risks from library vulnerabilities.
    References
      I&S-05 Production and Non-Production Environments mitigates T1195 Supply Chain Compromise
      Comments
      This control maintains separation of production and non-production environments, which can prevent the introduction of exploitable weaknesses and avoid exposure of sensitive information. During development, apply caution when selecting third-party libraries to integrate into applications and, where possible, lock software dependencies to specific versions rather than pulling the latest version on build to help mitigate supply chain compromise.
      References
        STA-10 Supply Chain Risk Management mitigates T1195 Supply Chain Compromise
        Comments
        The mitigative applications of this control relate to (e) "software supply chain risk management practices for ensuring software integrity, traceability, and provenance (e.g., software build practices, component management, and use of Software Bill of Materials (SBOMs))" SBOMs are known to provide transparency into software components, which may enable the identification of vulnerable software libraries, components, or code and mitigate the injection or execution of vulnerable or malicious code.
        References
          DSP-07 Data Protection by Design and Default mitigates T1195 Supply Chain Compromise
          Comments
          Data protection by design and default is emphasized in this control, requiring proactive integration of security and privacy measures at every stage of the SDLC and across all components. Adversaries may manipulate products or product delivery mechanisms prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise. In terms of mitigation, application developers should be cautious when selecting third-party libraries to integrate into their application. Additionally, where possible, developers should lock software dependencies to specific versions that are known to be secure rather than pulling the latest version on build.
          References

            ATT&CK Subtechniques

            Technique ID Technique Name Number of Mappings
            T1195.001 Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools 7
            T1195.002 Compromise Software Supply Chain 4