An adversary may add additional roles or permissions to an adversary-controlled user or service account to maintain persistent access to a container orchestration system. For example, an adversary with sufficient permissions may create a RoleBinding or a ClusterRoleBinding to bind a Role or ClusterRole to a Kubernetes account.(Citation: Kubernetes RBAC)(Citation: Aquasec Kubernetes Attack 2023) Where attribute-based access control (ABAC) is in use, an adversary with sufficient permissions may modify a Kubernetes ABAC policy to give the target account additional permissions.(Citation: Kuberentes ABAC)
This account modification may immediately follow Create Account or other malicious account activity. Adversaries may also modify existing Valid Accounts that they have compromised.
Note that where container orchestration systems are deployed in cloud environments, as with Google Kubernetes Engine, Amazon Elastic Kubernetes Service, and Azure Kubernetes Service, cloud-based role-based access control (RBAC) assignments or ABAC policies can often be used in place of or in addition to local permission assignments.(Citation: Google Cloud Kubernetes IAM)(Citation: AWS EKS IAM Roles for Service Accounts)(Citation: Microsoft Azure Kubernetes Service Service Accounts) In these cases, this technique may be used in conjunction with Additional Cloud Roles.
View in MITRE ATT&CK®| Capability ID | Capability Description | Mapping Type | ATT&CK ID | ATT&CK Name | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| IAM-16 | Authorization Mechanisms | mitigates | T1098.006 | Additional Container Cluster Roles |
Comments
This control requires both CSP and CSC to independently enforce formal approval processes for user access, implement dynamic and explicit authorization mechanisms. The guidance focuses on implementing technical measures to verify authorization and prevent unauthorized access and execution.
References
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| IAM-14 | Strong Authentication | mitigates | T1098.006 | Additional Container Cluster Roles |
Comments
This control requires both CSP and CSC to independently enforce multi-factor authentication (MFA) for all non-console administrative, remote, sensitive data, and third-party access, implement secure centralized authentication systems and digital certificates, protect credentials, monitor authentication activity, and ensure strong, risk-based authentication measures are consistently applied and reviewed.
References
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| IAM-04 | Separation of Duties | mitigates | T1098.006 | Additional Container Cluster Roles |
Comments
This control describes separation of duties (SoD) must be implemented by assigning and managing distinct roles for users, applications, and services, minimizing overlapping responsibilities and restricting access to critical functions through centralized role management, multi-level approvals, and automated provisioning tools.
An adversary may add additional roles or permissions to an adversary-controlled user or service account to maintain persistent access to a container orchestration system. In terms of mitigation, having multi-level approval chains for creating additional roles or ensuring that low-privileged user accounts do not have permissions to add permissions to accounts or update IAM policies could help catch the use of this technique.
References
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