T1543.001 Launch Agent

Adversaries may create or modify launch agents to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. When a user logs in, a per-user launchd process is started which loads the parameters for each launch-on-demand user agent from the property list (.plist) file found in <code>/System/Library/LaunchAgents</code>, <code>/Library/LaunchAgents</code>, and <code>~/Library/LaunchAgents</code>.(Citation: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons)(Citation: OSX Keydnap malware) (Citation: Antiquated Mac Malware) Property list files use the <code>Label</code>, <code>ProgramArguments </code>, and <code>RunAtLoad</code> keys to identify the Launch Agent's name, executable location, and execution time.(Citation: OSX.Dok Malware) Launch Agents are often installed to perform updates to programs, launch user specified programs at login, or to conduct other developer tasks.

Launch Agents can also be executed using the Launchctl command.

Adversaries may install a new Launch Agent that executes at login by placing a .plist file into the appropriate folders with the <code>RunAtLoad</code> or <code>KeepAlive</code> keys set to <code>true</code>.(Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan)(Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence) The Launch Agent name may be disguised by using a name from the related operating system or benign software. Launch Agents are created with user level privileges and execute with user level permissions.(Citation: OSX Malware Detection)(Citation: OceanLotus for OS X)

View in MITRE ATT&CK®

NIST 800-53 Mappings

Capability ID Capability Description Mapping Type ATT&CK ID ATT&CK Name Notes
CM-05 Access Restrictions for Change mitigates T1543.001 Launch Agent
CM-11 User-installed Software mitigates T1543.001 Launch Agent
CM-02 Baseline Configuration mitigates T1543.001 Launch Agent
IA-02 Identification and Authentication (Organizational Users) mitigates T1543.001 Launch Agent
AC-02 Account Management mitigates T1543.001 Launch Agent
AC-03 Access Enforcement mitigates T1543.001 Launch Agent
AC-05 Separation of Duties mitigates T1543.001 Launch Agent
AC-06 Least Privilege mitigates T1543.001 Launch Agent

VERIS Mappings

Capability ID Capability Description Mapping Type ATT&CK ID ATT&CK Name Notes
action.hacking.variety.Abuse of functionality Abuse of functionality. related-to T1543.001 Launch Agent
attribute.integrity.variety.Software installation Software installation or code modification related-to T1543.001 Launch Agent

GCP Mappings

Capability ID Capability Description Mapping Type ATT&CK ID ATT&CK Name Notes
google_secops Google Security Operations technique_scores T1543.001 Launch Agent
Comments
Google Security Ops is able to trigger an alert based on property list files scheduled to automatically execute upon startup on macOS platforms (e.g., "`/Library/LaunchAgents/`"). https://github.com/chronicle/detection-rules/blob/783e0e5947774785db1c55041b70176deeca6f46/mitre_attack/T1543_001_macos_launch_agent.yaral
References