Adversaries may inject malicious code into processes via the /proc filesystem in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Proc memory injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process.
Proc memory injection involves enumerating the memory of a process via the /proc filesystem (<code>/proc/[pid]</code>) then crafting a return-oriented programming (ROP) payload with available gadgets/instructions. Each running process has its own directory, which includes memory mappings. Proc memory injection is commonly performed by overwriting the target processes’ stack using memory mappings provided by the /proc filesystem. This information can be used to enumerate offsets (including the stack) and gadgets (or instructions within the program that can be used to build a malicious payload) otherwise hidden by process memory protections such as address space layout randomization (ASLR). Once enumerated, the target processes’ memory map within <code>/proc/[pid]/maps</code> can be overwritten using dd.(Citation: Uninformed Needle)(Citation: GDS Linux Injection)(Citation: DD Man)
Other techniques such as Dynamic Linker Hijacking may be used to populate a target process with more available gadgets. Similar to Process Hollowing, proc memory injection may target child processes (such as a backgrounded copy of sleep).(Citation: GDS Linux Injection)
Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via proc memory injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.
View in MITRE ATT&CK®| Capability ID | Capability Description | Mapping Type | ATT&CK ID | ATT&CK Name | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| PR.PS-05.02 | Mobile code prevention | Mitigates | T1055.009 | Proc Memory |
Comments
Mobile code procedures address specific actions taken to prevent the development, acquisition, and introduction of unacceptable mobile code within organizational systems, including requiring mobile code to be digitally signed by a trusted source.
References
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| Capability ID | Capability Description | Mapping Type | ATT&CK ID | ATT&CK Name | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CA-07 | Continuous Monitoring | mitigates | T1055.009 | Proc Memory | |
| SC-18 | Mobile Code | mitigates | T1055.009 | Proc Memory | |
| SI-16 | Memory Protection | mitigates | T1055.009 | Proc Memory | |
| SI-02 | Flaw Remediation | mitigates | T1055.009 | Proc Memory | |
| SI-03 | Malicious Code Protection | mitigates | T1055.009 | Proc Memory | |
| SI-04 | System Monitoring | mitigates | T1055.009 | Proc Memory | |
| AC-03 | Access Enforcement | mitigates | T1055.009 | Proc Memory | |
| AC-06 | Least Privilege | mitigates | T1055.009 | Proc Memory | |
| SC-07 | Boundary Protection | mitigates | T1055.009 | Proc Memory |
| Capability ID | Capability Description | Mapping Type | ATT&CK ID | ATT&CK Name | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| defender_for_app_service | Microsoft Defender for Cloud: Defender for App Service | technique_scores | T1055.009 | Proc Memory |
Comments
Injection attacks are specifically cited as a detection focus for Fileless Attack Detection, which is part of this control, with even more specific references to Process Hollowing, executable image injection, and threads started in a dynamically allocated code segment. Detection is periodic at an unknown rate.
References
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