Adversaries may abuse authentication packages to execute DLLs when the system boots. Windows authentication package DLLs are loaded by the Local Security Authority (LSA) process at system start. They provide support for multiple logon processes and multiple security protocols to the operating system.(Citation: MSDN Authentication Packages)
Adversaries can use the autostart mechanism provided by LSA authentication packages for persistence by placing a reference to a binary in the Windows Registry location <code>HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\</code> with the key value of <code>"Authentication Packages"=<target binary></code>. The binary will then be executed by the system when the authentication packages are loaded.
View in MITRE ATT&CK®| Capability ID | Capability Description | Mapping Type | ATT&CK ID | ATT&CK Name | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| intel-vt | Intel Virtualization Technology | Win 11, VBS, Memory Integrity | T1547.002 | Authentication Package |
Comments
Memory integrity is a Virtualization-based security feature that protects and hardens Windows by running kernel mode code integrity within the isolated virtual environment of VBS (VBS uses Intel VT-x). Memory integrity also restricts kernel memory allocations that could be used to compromise the system. Memory integrity is sometimes referred to as hypervisor-protected code integrity (HVCI). VBS provides an isolated environment that acts as a root-of-trust for the OS and its core components. It is enabled by Intel VT-x, VT-x2 with Extended Page Tables, SMMUs (Intel VT-d) and Secure Boot (Intel Boot Guard).
Memory Integrity protects against behaviors that involve exploitation of kernel components including core drivers in memory, changing security configurations and running untrusted code (based on signatures).
"HVCI protects modification of the Control Flow Guard (CFG) bitmap for kernel mode drivers. Protects the kernel mode code integrity process that ensures that other trusted kernel processes have a valid certificate."
"Hypervisor-protected code integrity introduces a new rule that no kernel memory pages are both writeable and executable, which eliminates an entire category of attacks that dynamically generate code. Additionally, HVCI comes enabled with a code integrity security policy that blocks drivers known to be used in kernel tampering, including Mimikatz, the old vulnerable VBox driver, and the Capcom driver commonly used in rootkits. Ultimately, HVCI provides optimal protection for the kernel against tampering and escalation of privilege attacks. ... With HVCI enabled, attempts to modify the process structures will fail, preventing the protected process flag from being removed, which prevents process memory inspection or module injection into LSA."
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