T1068 Exploitation for Privilege Escalation Mappings

Memory integrity is a Virtualization-based security feature that protects and hardens Windows by running kernel mode code integrity within the isolated virtual environment of VBS (VBS uses Intel VT-x). Memory integrity also restricts kernel memory allocations that could be used to compromise the system. Memory integrity is sometimes referred to as hypervisor-protected code integrity (HVCI). VBS provides an isolated environment that acts as a root-of-trust for the OS and its core components. It is enabled by Intel VT-x, VT-x2 with Extended Page Tables, SMMUs (Intel VT-d) and Secure Boot (Intel Boot Guard). Memory Integrity protects against behaviors that involve exploitation of kernel components including core drivers in memory, changing security configurations and running untrusted code (based on signatures). "HVCI protects modification of the Control Flow Guard (CFG) bitmap for kernel mode drivers. Protects the kernel mode code integrity process that ensures that other trusted kernel processes have a valid certificate." "Hypervisor-protected code integrity introduces a new rule that no kernel memory pages are both writeable and executable, which eliminates an entire category of attacks that dynamically generate code. Additionally, HVCI comes enabled with a code integrity security policy that blocks drivers known to be used in kernel tampering, including Mimikatz, the old vulnerable VBox driver, and the Capcom driver commonly used in rootkits. Ultimately, HVCI provides optimal protection for the kernel against tampering and escalation of privilege attacks. ... With HVCI enabled, attempts to modify the process structures will fail, preventing the protected process flag from being removed, which prevents process memory inspection or module injection into LSA."

Memory integrity is a Virtualization-based security feature that protects and hardens Windows by running kernel mode code integrity within the isolated virtual environment of VBS (VBS uses Intel VT-x). Memory integrity also restricts kernel memory allocations that could be used to compromise the system. Memory integrity is sometimes referred to as hypervisor-protected code integrity (HVCI). VBS provides an isolated environment that acts as a root-of-trust for the OS and its core components. It is enabled by Intel VT-x, VT-x2 with Extended Page Tables, SMMUs (Intel VT-d) and Secure Boot (Intel Boot Guard). Memory Integrity protects against behaviors that involve exploitation of kernel components including core drivers in memory, changing security configurations and running untrusted code (based on signatures). "HVCI protects modification of the Control Flow Guard (CFG) bitmap for kernel mode drivers. Protects the kernel mode code integrity process that ensures that other trusted kernel processes have a valid certificate." "Hypervisor-protected code integrity introduces a new rule that no kernel memory pages are both writeable and executable, which eliminates an entire category of attacks that dynamically generate code. Additionally, HVCI comes enabled with a code integrity security policy that blocks drivers known to be used in kernel tampering, including Mimikatz, the old vulnerable VBox driver, and the Capcom driver commonly used in rootkits. Ultimately, HVCI provides optimal protection for the kernel against tampering and escalation of privilege attacks. ... With HVCI enabled, attempts to modify the process structures will fail, preventing the protected process flag from being removed, which prevents process memory inspection or module injection into LSA."

Windows Kernel Data Protection uses VBS (Intel PTT, Intel VT-x, Intel VT-d, Intel VT-rp, and Intel BootGuard) to protect kernel data, kernel data structures, and OS drivers from tampering attacks. With KDP, software running in kernel-mode can protect read-only memory statically (a section of its own image) or dynamically (pool memory that can be initialized only once). KDP only establishes write protections in VTL1 for the GPAs backing a protected memory region using the SLAT page tables for the hypervisor to enforce. This way, no software running in the NT kernel (VTL0) can have the permissions needed to change the memory. The goal of using KDP is to protect internal policy state after it has been initialized (i.e., read from the registry or generated at boot time). These data structures are critical to protect as if they are tampered with a driver that is properly signed but vulnerable could attack the policy data structures and then install an unsigned driver on the system. With KDP, this attack is mitigated by ensuring the policy data structures cannot be tampered with. The score of significant highlights this real-time protection of the kernel data, data structures, and drivers from tampering attacks. HW Enforced stack protection (HWESP) relies on Virtualization Based Security (VBS) which use Intel PTT, Intel VT-x, Intel VT-d and Intel BootGuard to ensure the OS components loaded are not tampered with and isolate security sensitive processes. Additionally, it uses Intel Control Flow Enforcement Technology (Intel CET) to allow hardware to ensure that sensitive areas in the regions of memory (such as the stack) for processes are not tampered with by either injecting code or changing the control flow of the code or both. HWESP includes four components Code Integrity Guard, Arbitrary Code Guard, Control Flow Guard and Shadow Stack protections. Code Integrity Guard attempts to prevent "... arbitrary code generation by enforcing signature requirements for loading binaries". Arbitrary Code Guard attempts to ensure "... signed pages are immutable and dynamic code cannot be generated ...". Control Flow Guard ensures control flow integrity by enforcing "... integrity on indirect calls (forward-edge CFI)." Shadow Stack ensures control flow integrity by enforcing "... integrity on return addresses on the stack (backward-edge CFI)." Together these features aim to ensure integrity of binary images run on Windows 11 and prevent dynamic code from running or changing the control flow of the code. Since these features offer real-time protection for sensitive regions of memory, these are marked as offering significant protection. The Vulnerable Driver Blocklist uses Virtualization Based Security (VBS) Memory Integrity feature or HVCI, which in turn rely on Intel PTT, Intel VT-x, Intel VT-d and Intel BootGuard to create an isolated virtual environment for the kernel such that attacks from vulnerable drivers are prevented. It uses a deny list approach along with code signing checks to ensure vulnerable drivers are not modified and to prevent attacks against them. "... the vulnerable driver blocklist is also enforced when either memory integrity (also known as hypervisor-protected code integrity or HVCI), Smart App Control, or S mode is active." "The blocklist is updated with each new major release of Windows, typically 1-2 times per year..." "Memory integrity and virtualization-based security (VBS) improve the threat model of Windows and provide stronger protections against malware trying to exploit the Windows kernel. VBS uses the Windows hypervisor to create an isolated virtual environment that becomes the root of trust of the OS that assumes the kernel can be compromised. Memory integrity is a critical component that protects and hardens Windows by running kernel mode code integrity within the isolated virtual environment of VBS."

Windows Kernel Data Protection uses VBS (Intel PTT, Intel VT-x, Intel VT-d, Intel VT-rp, and Intel BootGuard) to protect kernel data, kernel data structures, and OS drivers from tampering attacks. With KDP, software running in kernel-mode can protect read-only memory statically (a section of its own image) or dynamically (pool memory that can be initialized only once). KDP only establishes write protections in VTL1 for the GPAs backing a protected memory region using the SLAT page tables for the hypervisor to enforce. This way, no software running in the NT kernel (VTL0) can have the permissions needed to change the memory. The goal of using KDP is to protect internal policy state after it has been initialized (i.e., read from the registry or generated at boot time). These data structures are critical to protect as if they are tampered with a driver that is properly signed but vulnerable could attack the policy data structures and then install an unsigned driver on the system. With KDP, this attack is mitigated by ensuring the policy data structures cannot be tampered with. The score of significant highlights this real-time protection of the kernel data, data structures, and drivers from tampering attacks. HW Enforced stack protection (HWESP) relies on Virtualization Based Security (VBS) which use Intel PTT, Intel VT-x, Intel VT-d and Intel BootGuard to ensure the OS components loaded are not tampered with and isolate security sensitive processes. Additionally, it uses Intel Control Flow Enforcement Technology (Intel CET) to allow hardware to ensure that sensitive areas in the regions of memory (such as the stack) for processes are not tampered with by either injecting code or changing the control flow of the code or both. HWESP includes four components Code Integrity Guard, Arbitrary Code Guard, Control Flow Guard and Shadow Stack protections. Code Integrity Guard attempts to prevent "... arbitrary code generation by enforcing signature requirements for loading binaries". Arbitrary Code Guard attempts to ensure "... signed pages are immutable and dynamic code cannot be generated ...". Control Flow Guard ensures control flow integrity by enforcing "... integrity on indirect calls (forward-edge CFI)." Shadow Stack ensures control flow integrity by enforcing "... integrity on return addresses on the stack (backward-edge CFI)." Together these features aim to ensure integrity of binary images run on Windows 11 and prevent dynamic code from running or changing the control flow of the code. Since these features offer real-time protection for sensitive regions of memory, these are marked as offering significant protection. The Vulnerable Driver Blocklist uses Virtualization Based Security (VBS) Memory Integrity feature or HVCI, which in turn rely on Intel PTT, Intel VT-x, Intel VT-d and Intel BootGuard to create an isolated virtual environment for the kernel such that attacks from vulnerable drivers are prevented. It uses a deny list approach along with code signing checks to ensure vulnerable drivers are not modified and to prevent attacks against them. "... the vulnerable driver blocklist is also enforced when either memory integrity (also known as hypervisor-protected code integrity or HVCI), Smart App Control, or S mode is active." "The blocklist is updated with each new major release of Windows, typically 1-2 times per year..." "Memory integrity and virtualization-based security (VBS) improve the threat model of Windows and provide stronger protections against malware trying to exploit the Windows kernel. VBS uses the Windows hypervisor to create an isolated virtual environment that becomes the root of trust of the OS that assumes the kernel can be compromised. Memory integrity is a critical component that protects and hardens Windows by running kernel mode code integrity within the isolated virtual environment of VBS."

CrowdStrike Falcon Hardware Enhanced Exploit Detection (HEED) is an advanced security feature that integrates Intel Processor Trace (Intel PT) technology to enhance visibility into sophisticated attack techniques, including real-time detection of privilege escalation exploits. These exploits involve attackers manipulating software vulnerabilities in applications, services, or the operating system itself to execute malicious code and elevate their access to system-level privileges. Intel PT provides deep insights into program execution at the hardware level, capturing critical telemetry data such as control flow and memory access in real-time. This capability allows security teams to detect abnormal behavior like suspicious API calls, unexpected code paths, or attempts to gain unauthorized access to higher-level system privileges. By monitoring these low-level activities, HEED makes it easier to identify privilege escalation tactics and other attack methods that aim to compromise sensitive systems. By combining Intel PT's detailed telemetry with advanced detection algorithms, HEED offers a powerful defense against evasive exploit techniques that may bypass traditional security measures. This proactive approach allows organizations to quickly identify and mitigate privilege escalation attempts, strengthening the protection of critical systems and internal infrastructure from evolving cyber threats.

This vulnerability allows bypassing sandbox protection and run native code.

CVE-2022-47966 is a remote code execution vulnerability that affects many ManageEngine products due to misconfiguration of security features. Adversaries can utilized this vulnerability to run arbitrary java. APTs have been observed exploiting this vulnerability to gain access, to public-facing applications, establish persistence, and move laterally. They've also been observed to create local user accounts with administrative privileges, use valid but disabled user accounts, delete logs, establish command and control communications, ... **the list goes on and on due to fantastic, detailed reporting**

This vulnerability is exploited by an unprivileged attacker by conducting malicious activity in GPU memory, gaining access to already freed memory. If successful, the threat actor could escalate their privileges to root as well as gain access to sensitive information. Detailed information about how adversaries exploit the GPU are not publicly available.

CVE-2020-0787 is a privilege elevation vulnerability in the Windows Background Intelligent Transfer Service (BITS). An actor can exploit this vulnerability if it improperly handles symbolic links to execute arbitrary code with system-level privileges.

CVE-2020-0069 is an insufficient input validation vulnerability in multiple MediaTek chipsets that, combined with missing SELinux restrictions in the Command Queue drivers' ioctl handlers, allows an adversary to perform an out-of-bounds write leading to privilege escalation.

This zero-day vulnerability presents itself after an adversary has already infiltrated the victim's network and enables the adversary to obtain SYSTEM level privileges via Microsoft Windows Hyper-V product. As of now, details of how the attacker's methods to exploit this vulnerability are undisclosed.

CVE-2019-0211 is a privilege escalation vulnerability in Apache HTTP Server with MPM event, worker, or prefork that allows an attacker to execute code with the privileges of that parent process (usually root).

Local escalation of privilege attack. Attacker would most likely gain access through an executable or script on the local computer sent to the user via an email attachment.

This vulnerability is a zero-day exploit that is believed to still be utilized by various adversarial groups leading to limited publicly available exploitation information. The vulnerability is a "heap-based protector flood susceptibility impacting the Windows DWM Core Library" enabling an adversary to gain SYSTEM privileges.

The Polkit/Pwnkit vulnerability (CVE-2021-4034) is a critical vulnerability impacting every major Linux distribution. Its attack vector allows privilege escalation and can even give the attacker root access.

CVE-2020-1472, an elevation of privilege vulnerability in Microsoft’s Netlogon. A remote attacker can exploit this vulnerability to breach unpatched Active Directory domain controllers and obtain domain administrator access.

This vulnerability is exploited by bypassing user authentication mechanisms via a lack of proper validation of a user-supplied string before executing a system call. This could grant adversaries root access to execute arbitrary code.

This vulnerability is exploited by an adversary who has gained access to a valid account on the vCenter Server. The adversary can gain access to unencrypted Postgres credentials on the server, which grants the adversary access to the vCenter's internal database where the vpxuser account passphrase is stored. Adversaries can leverage this information to decrypt the vpxuser password, which will grant them root privileges.

This vulnerability is exploited by an adversary who has already exploited an ESXi system and gained access to a valid account. Using this account, the adversary creates a new AD group named "ESXi Admins" that the ESXi Hypervisor grants full admin privileges. Adversary groups such as Storm-0506, Storm-1175, Octo Tempest, and Manatee Tempest have leveraged this vulnerability to deploy ransomware known as Akira and Black Basta onto compromised environments.

This vulnerability is exploited through multiple unrestricted uploads. Adversaries with authenticated administrator privileges leverage this vulnerability to perform unauthorized file writes on the system via a maliciously crafted archive upload within the administrator web interface in Pulse Connect Secure.

This vulnerability is exploited through improper privilege escalation in the Web User Interface feature of Cisco IOS XE software. Attackers first used this vulnerability to elevate privileges from a normal user to root by leveraging a newly created local user account. This allowed them to write malicious implants that enable them to execute arbitrary commands to the file system This CVE was exploited after the adversary exploited CVE-2023-20198.

This vulnerability is exploited by an adversary that has gained local access to the victim system. If successfully exploited, the adversary would gain full SYSTEM level privileges. This CVE has been leveraged in the wild by Storm-0506 involved deploying Black Basta ransomware, initiated through a Qakbot infection and exploiting a Windows vulnerability (CVE-2023-28252) to gain elevated privileges. The attackers used tools like Cobalt Strike and Pypykatz for credential theft and lateral movement, eventually creating an "ESX Admins" group to encrypt the ESXi file system and disrupt hosted VMs. Based on the described exploitation of CVE-2023-28252 and the associated attack activities, the following MITRE ATT&CK Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) could be linked to this CVE:

This vulnerability is exploited by an authenticated adversary. It is identified as requiring local access via Microsoft; however, other reports have identified remote, authenticated adversaries can exploit this vulnerability. A successful exploitation would grant an attacker SYSTEM level privileges. This vulnerability has been exploited in the wild; however, technical details of how this was leveraged in an attack has not been publicly shared.

This vulnerability is exploited by an adversary that has gained local access to the victim system. If successfully exploited, the adversary would gain limited SYSTEM level privileges. This vulnerability has been exploited in the wild; however, no technical information has been published related to the exploitation. Microsoft has identified that successful exploitation of this vulnerability requires an attacker to win a race condition.

This vulnerability is exploited by an adversary who has already gained local access to the victim system. To exploit this vulnerability, the adversary needs to already have access to the system and must also "win a race condition". If successfully exploited, the adversary would gain elevated privileges on the victim system. This vulnerability has been identified as exploited in the wild; however, technical exploitation details have not been publicly shared.

This vulnerability is exploited by an adversary who has already gained local access to the victim system. The adversary gains access to the vulnerability either by social engineering, a separate exploit, or malware. Exploiting this vulnerability grants the adversary elevated privileges on the victim system. This vulnerability has been identified as being exploited in the wild; however, technical details of how the vulnerability has been leveraged by a hacker or APT have not been publicly released.

This vulnerability is exploited by an adversary who already has access to the victim system. This vulnerability, also known as SpoolFool, is a local privilege escalation vulnerability in the Windows Print Spooler service, which manages print operations on Windows systems. This vulnerability allows attackers to execute code with SYSTEM-level privileges by exploiting the `SpoolDirectory` configuration setting. The `SpoolDirectory` is writable by all users and can be manipulated using the `SetPrinterDataEx()` function, provided the attacker has `PRINTER_ACCESS_ADMINISTER` permissions. The exploit involves creating a directory junction and using a Universal Naming Convention (UNC) path to write a malicious DLL to a privileged directory, such as `C:\Windows\System32\spool\drivers\x64\4`. This DLL is then loaded and executed by the Print Spooler service, granting the attacker elevated privileges. This method circumvents previous security checks designed to prevent privilege escalation through the Print Spooler. The vulnerability has been exploited in the wild, with attackers using tools like the SpoolFool proof of concept (PoC) published on GitHub. One observed attack involved creating a local administrator account with a default password, indicating the potential for significant system compromise. The Gelsemium APT group has been linked to activity exploiting this vulnerability, highlighting its use in advanced persistent threat campaigns.

This vulnerability is leveraged by an adversary who has already gained local access to the victim system. The adversary exploits this vulnerability to elevate their privileges on the system via the Print Spooler, which could give the adversary the ability to distribute and install malicious programs on victims’ computers that can steal stored data This vulnerability has been actively exploited by cybercriminals to gain unauthorized access to corporate networks and resources. Details about who is exploiting this vulnerability and their exact movements have not been publicly shared.

This vulnerability is exploited by an attacker who has obtained access to manipulate the Print Spooler service on the target system. The vulnerability lies in the Print Spooler, specifically involving XML manipulation and path traversal to a writable path containing a modified version of the `prntvpt.dll` file. This vulnerability has been exploited by threat actors to load unauthorized code on Windows systems. Attackers leveraged this flaw to execute arbitrary code, allowing them to manipulate system processes and potentially deploy additional malware or perform further malicious activities. The exploit in question is actively being used in the wild. It involves exploiting the path traversal vulnerability to load a malicious DLL by manipulating the Print Spooler service. Once the vulnerability is exploited, attackers can bypass impersonation controls to load untrusted resources, thereby executing arbitrary code with elevated privileges.

This vulnerability is exploited by an attacker who has obtained access to the target system. The vulnerability lies in the Windows Common Log File System (CLFS) Driver, specifically due to improper bounds checking on the `cbSymbolZone` field in the Base Record Header for the base log file (BLF). This vulnerability has been exploited by threat actors to gain elevated privileges on Windows systems. Attackers leveraged this flaw to execute arbitrary system commands, allowing them to manipulate system processes and potentially deploy additional malware or perform further malicious activities. The exploit in question is actively being used in the wild, primarily in targeted attacks. It involves setting the `cbSymbolZone` field to an invalid offset, triggering an out-of-bound write that corrupts a pointer to the CClfsContainer object. Once the vulnerability is exploited, attackers can manipulate memory to perform arbitrary actions with SYSTEM-level privileges. This allows them to achieve their objectives, such as disabling security applications and gaining full control over the compromised system.

CVE-2022-41033 is exploited by an attacker who has obtained access to the target system. The vulnerability lies in the Windows COM+ Event System Service, due to improper handling of privilege escalation scenarios. This vulnerability has been exploited by threat actors to gain elevated privileges on Windows systems. Attackers leveraged this flaw to execute arbitrary system commands, allowing them to manipulate system processes and potentially deploy additional malware or perform further malicious activities. The exploit in question is actively being used in the wild, primarily in targeted attacks. It involves pairing the elevation of privilege vulnerability with other code-execution exploits, often through social engineering tactics such as enticing a user to open a malicious attachment or visit a harmful website. Once the vulnerability is exploited, attackers can manipulate system privileges to perform arbitrary actions with SYSTEM-level permissions. This allows them to achieve their objectives, such as installing programs, viewing or changing data, and creating new accounts with full user rights.

This vulnerability is exploited by an attacker who has obtained local access with low privileges on the target system. The vulnerability lies in the Cryptography API: Next Generation (CNG) Key Isolation Service, specifically due to a memory overflow issue. This vulnerability has been exploited by threat actors to gain elevated privileges on Windows systems. Attackers leveraged this flaw to execute arbitrary commands with SYSTEM privileges, allowing them to manipulate system processes and deploy additional malware to perform further malicious activities. The exploit in question is actively being used in the wild. It involves exploiting the memory overflow in the CNG Key Isolation Service to gain SYSTEM-level access. Once the vulnerability is exploited, attackers can manipulate system processes and access sensitive information stored in the service, such as cryptographic keys. This allows them to achieve their objectives, such as executing code with elevated privileges and compromising the security of the affected system.

This vulnerability is exploited by an attacker who has obtained local access tothe target system. The vulnerability lies in the Client Server Run-Time Subsystem (CSRSS) on Windows, specifically in the activation context caching mechanism, due to improper handling of crafted assembly manifests. This vulnerability has been exploited by threat actors to gain elevated privileges on Windows systems. Attackers leveraged this flaw to execute arbitrary system-level commands, allowing them to manipulate system processes and deploy additional malware to perform further malicious activities. The exploit in question is actively being used in the wild, primarily in targeted attacks. It involves creating a malicious activation context by providing a crafted assembly manifest, which is cached and used the next time the process spawns. Once the vulnerability is exploited, attackers can load a malicious DLL to achieve system-level code execution. This allows them to achieve their objectives, such as executing arbitrary code with elevated privileges, with the same permissions as the compromised system's user.

This vulnerability is exploited by an attacker who has already obtained access to a target system to execute code. The vulnerability lies in the Common Log File System (CLFS) driver, specifically in the `CClfsBaseFilePersisted::LoadContainerQ()` function, due to a logic bug in handling container context objects. This vulnerability has been exploited by threat actors to gain elevated privileges on Windows systems. Attackers leveraged this flaw to execute arbitrary code with system-level privileges, allowing them to manipulate system processes and deploy additional malware to perform further malicious activities. The exploit in question is actively being used in the wild, primarily in ransomware campaigns. It involves corrupting the `pContainer` field of a container context object with a user-mode address by using malformed BLF files. Once the vulnerability is exploited, attackers can manipulate memory to execute code with elevated privileges. This allows them to achieve their objectives, such as stealing the System token and gaining full control over the compromised system.

This vulnerability is exploited by a local or remote adversary who already has access to the system. The vulnerability enables the attacker to elevate their privileges due to over permissive ACLs on system file and elevate their privileges to SYSTEM level. By exploiting this vulnerability an attacker could gain the ability to run arbitrary code, install programs, view/modify/delete data, or create new user accounts with full rights.

This vulnerability is exploited by an attacker who has obtained administrative console access on the target system. The vulnerability lies in the Win32k driver, specifically in the NtGdiResetDC function, due to improper handling of user-mode callbacks. This vulnerability has been exploited by threat actors to gain elevated privileges on Windows servers. Attackers leveraged this flaw to execute arbitrary kernel commands, allowing them to manipulate system processes and deploy additional malware to perform further malicious activities. The exploit in question is actively being used in the wild, primarily in espionage campaigns. It involves triggering a use-after-free condition by executing the ResetDC function a second time for the same handle during a callback. Once the vulnerability is exploited, attackers can manipulate memory to perform arbitrary kernel function calls with controlled parameters. This allows them to achieve their objectives, such as reading and writing kernel memory, with the same permissions as the compromised system's user.

The vulnerability in Microsoft Windows allows local attackers to escalate privileges by exploiting a flaw in the Windows Installer service. By creating a junction, attackers can delete targeted files or directories, potentially executing arbitrary code with SYSTEM privileges. However, attackers must already have access and the ability to execute low-privileged code on the target system to exploit this vulnerability. This vulnerability has been identified as exploited in the wild; however, specific details on how the vulnerability was exploited have not been publicly released.